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The Vertical Limit of State Sovereignty

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THE VERTICAL LIMIT OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY*

By DEAN N. REINHARDT**

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* The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

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I. INTRODUCTION

[T]here is no immediate urgency about defining the upper boundary of "airspace" or reaching international agreement on the upward or outward extent of territorial sovereignty in space.

- The Honorable John A. Johnson, First General Counsel of the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1959.¹

I see no good reason for postponing a systematic effort to explore and reach agreement on this question of delimiting the upward reach of territorial sovereignty, that is, the exclusive power and authority of the underlying state. It is not the kind of question, in my opinion, that will be answered by the accumulation of scientific knowledge or by further experience in space technology.

- The Honorable John A. Johnson, First General Counsel of the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1961²

THE DEBATE OVER the delineation of the boundary between state sovereignty and "outer space," or the vertical limitation of state sovereignty, predates the space age. Many articles were written on the subject in the 1950s as the space age was dawning. However, the debate did not begin then; instead, it began during the early days of aircraft flight and unfortunately continues into the twenty-first century. Because there is no agreed delineation between a state's territory and free outer space, the vertical limit of state sovereignty is unsettled and each state is left to define the limits of its vertical sovereignty. However, no state has explicitly done this.

There are several reasons why delineation is important today. First, new technologies are under development that may soon allow various types of vehicles to operate at a high altitude. Several concepts for intercontinental vehicles, operational in the upper atmosphere, are under development. Additionally, sub-orbital space tourism is nearing commercial application. Finally, senior members of the U.S. Air Force have expressed an interest in operations in what they have termed "near space," the part of the atmosphere between 65,000 feet (about 12.3

¹ John A. Johnson, Address Before the House Committee on Science (Mar. 11, 1959), in Colonel Martin Menter, *Astronautical Law* 30 (1959) (unpublished thesis, Industrial College of the Armed Forces) (on file with the McGill University Nahum Gelber Law Library).

² John A. Johnson (Apr. 28, 1961), in 55 *PROC. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L.* 165, 167 (1961) [hereinafter Johnson, *PROCEEDINGS*].

miles or 19.8 kilometers) and 186 miles (300 kilometers).³ This area is above the altitude at which conventional aircraft normally operate and below the closest point to the Earth of the orbit, or perigee,⁴ of most satellites.⁵

Delineation is important to ensure equal access to space. Although outer space is free,⁶ if states are allowed to claim vertical sovereignty up to the point where orbital dynamics are possible, other states will be precluded from having free access to space.⁷ Setting a low limit of vertical sovereignty will allow launching states the potential of freely accessing space, but neighboring states could still legitimately express concerns based on safety.⁸ Mr. John A. Johnson, the first General Counsel of the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and formerly the General Counsel of the U.S. Air Force,⁹ said in 1964, "there should therefore be no legal basis for protesting, *merely on grounds of unpermitted presence*, the overflight of national territory by ascending and descending spacecraft, regardless of altitude."¹⁰ Setting a low limit on state sovereignty does not mean

³ See Lorenzo Cortes, *Air Force Chief Cites Vitality of "Near Space" Capabilities*, DEF. DAILY, Sept. 16, 2004.

⁴ "The point on an elliptical orbit at which the satellite is closest to the Earth is called the perigee of the orbit, and the point at which it is furthest from the Earth is called the apogee." DAVID WRIGHT ET AL., THE PHYSICS OF SPACE SECURITY 24 (2005), available at http://www.ucsusa.org/global_security/space_weapons/the-physics-of-space-security.html.

⁵ See David Bond, *Persistent Perspective*, AV. WK. & SPACE TECH., Dec. 20, 2004, at 19.

⁶ See Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, art. I, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty] ("Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free for exploration and use by all States without discrimination of any kind, on a basis of equality and in accordance with international law, and there shall be free access to all areas of celestial bodies.").

⁷ In 1964, Mr. Johnson said,

It is evident that if territorial sovereignty—that is, the exclusive control of the underlying State which now applies to the area denominated "air space"—is to embrace the entire space below the lowest altitude at which the orbiting of earth satellites has occurred, man will not—to use Ambassador Stevenson's words—"be free to venture into space on the same basis that he has ventured on the high seas."

John A. Johnson, *Freedom and Control in Outer Space*, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE ON SPACE SCIENCE AND SPACE LAW 138, 140 (Mortimer D. Schwartz ed., 1964) [hereinafter Johnson, *Freedom and Control*].

⁸ See *Air Force Aide Named Space Agency Counsel*, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1958, at 10.

⁹ *Id.*

¹⁰ Johnson, *Freedom and Control*, *supra* note 7, at 141 (emphasis added).

that states will have total freedom of action.¹¹ Even in space, states cannot take actions that harm the interests of other states.¹² But states will have to point to a legitimate safety concern before objecting to another state's activities.¹³ They will not be able to object merely on the basis of overflight.¹⁴ This should encourage states to work together to draft uniform rules of operation.

Another issue raised by the absence of an international definition of the space boundary is liability for space activities.¹⁵ Vehicles operating at high altitude, but not in orbit, may not be covered by either the Convention on INTERNATIONAL LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE CAUSED BY SPACE OBJECTS¹⁶ (the Liability Convention) or the Convention for International Carriage by Air¹⁷ (the Montreal Convention), so parties presumably would have to use domestic tort law to determine liability. As more vehicles operate in the upper atmosphere, liability claims are likely to increase. An international agreement that "space" begins above a certain altitude could provide certainty for liability by defining the term "space object." If a space object caused damage on the ground or to aircraft in flight, the liability convention would apply, and the absolute liability it provides would come into play.¹⁸ Other international agreements also could benefit from a precise delineation of vertical sovereignty. For example, the Preliminary Draft Protocol on Matters Specific to Space Assets, prepared by the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) as a protocol to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment (opened for signa-

¹¹ See Outer Space Treaty, *supra* note 6, art. IX.

¹² *Id.*

¹³ *Id.*

¹⁴ Johnson, *Freedom and Control*, *supra* note 17, at 141.

¹⁵ See Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Liability Convention]; Convention for International Carriage by Air, May 28, 1999, S. TREATY Doc. No. 106-45, 2242 U.N.T.S. 350 [hereinafter Montreal Convention]. The Montreal Convention "applies to all international carriage of persons, baggage or cargo performed by aircraft for reward." *Id.* art. 1(1). The Convention does not define the term "aircraft." See *id.*

¹⁶ See generally Liability Convention, *supra* note 15. See *infra* notes 335 - 339, 351 and accompanying text.

¹⁷ See generally Montreal Convention, *supra* note 15.

¹⁸ Article II of the Liability Convention provides: "A launching State shall be absolutely liable to pay compensation for damage caused by its space object on the surface of the earth or to aircraft in flight." Liability Convention, *supra* note 15, ART. II.

ture on November 16, 2001), does not define space, although this term is pivotal in determining the application of the protocol.¹⁹

The increased activity in the upper atmosphere (or in near space) should be governed by uniform international rules.²⁰ For safety reasons, it would be beneficial to have uniform standards similar to those that exist for operations in the lower atmosphere.²¹ Uniformity is "more often than not a precondition for safety."²² One possibility would be to have the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)²³ develop these standards as it does for operations in international airspace.²⁴

Finally, states must know the limits of other states' sovereignty to avoid conflict along the borders. The time has come to settle this gap in the law.

II. TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY

A. VERTICAL SOVEREIGNTY

States have exercised sovereignty over the space above land at least as far back as the Roman Empire.²⁵ Roman law (and the

¹⁹ See Preliminary Draft Protocol on Matters Specific to Space Assets, <http://www.unidroit.org/english/publications/proceedings/2004/study/72j/s-72j-13rev-e.pdf> (last visited Nov. 24, 2006). For example, the draft protocol states:

"space assets" means:

- (i) any identifiable asset that is intended to be launched and placed in space or that is in space;
- (ii) any identifiable asset assembled or manufactured in space;
- (iii) any identifiable launch vehicle that is expendable or can be reused to transport persons or goods to and from space; and
- (iv) any separately identifiable component forming a part of an asset referred to in the preceding sub-paragraphs or attached to or contained within such asset.

As used in this definition, the term "space" means outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies.

Id. art. I(g) (footnotes omitted).

²⁰ See MYRES S. MCDUGAL ET AL., *LAW AND PUBLIC ORDER IN SPACE* 590 (1963).

²¹ *Id.*

²² *Id.*

²³ See Convention on International Civil Aviation art. 43, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 [hereinafter Chicago Convention] ("An organization to be named the International Civil Aviation Organization is formed by the Convention. It is made up of an Assembly, a Council, and such other bodies as may be necessary.").

²⁴ See *infra* note 451 and accompanying text.

²⁵ John Cobb Cooper, *Roman Law and the Maxim "Cujus est solum" in International Air Law*, reprinted in JOHN COBB COOPER, *EXPLORATIONS IN AEROSPACE LAW* 54, 57–58 (1968) [hereinafter COOPER, *EXPLORATIONS IN AEROSPACE LAW*].

law of succeeding states) recognized, regulated, and protected private rights in space above the surface.²⁶ Because a state cannot impose its will within the territory of another state, these states therefore claimed territorial sovereignty above their surface territory.²⁷ Although writers generally agree that Roman law recognized private rights in air space, the writers do not agree on the extent of the right recognized.²⁸

At the beginning of the twentieth century, "international flight was practically unregulated."²⁹ In 1902, Paul Fauchille of France, Rapporteur for the Institute of International Law on the subject of the legal status of the airships, proposed that states should only have exclusive rights in the airspace immediately over their territory up to an altitude of 1,500 meters (4,920 feet).³⁰ Some of Fauchille's proposals were translated by Professor John C. Cooper as follows:

the air is free—States having only rights necessary for their self-preservation, such rights relating to the prevention of spying, to the customs, to the sanitary police, and to the necessities of defense; subject to certain exceptions, air navigation is prohibited in a "security" zone extending 1500 meters up from the surface territory of a State; only public aircraft of a State are permitted to fly freely in the security zone of that State; the subjacent State may also regulate landing and departure through the security zone above its territory³¹

The opposite view was expressed in 1906 by Professor John Westlake of the United Kingdom who advocated no upward limit of state sovereignty.³²

²⁶ *Id.*

²⁷ *Id.*

²⁸ *Id.* at 59.

²⁹ John Cobb Cooper, *The International Air Navigation Conference, Paris 1910*, 19 J. AIR L. & COM. 127 (1952) [hereinafter Cooper, *Air Navigation Conference*], reprinted in COOPER, EXPLORATIONS IN AEROSPACE LAW, *supra* note 25, at 104, 106 (noting that German zeppelins flew over Switzerland and German balloons frequently landed in France).

³⁰ NICHOLAS GRIEF, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE AIRSPACE OF THE HIGH SEAS, in 14 UTRECHT STUDIES IN AIR AND SPACE LAW 50–51 (G.C.M. Reijnen et al. eds., 1994).

³¹ John Cobb Cooper, *A Study on the Legal Status of Aircraft* [hereinafter Cooper, *A Study*], in COOPER, EXPLORATIONS IN AEROSPACE LAW, *supra* note 25, at 205, 218 (footnotes omitted).

³² John Cobb Cooper, *High Altitude Flight and National Sovereignty* [hereinafter Cooper, *High Altitude Flight*], in COOPER, EXPLORATIONS IN AEROSPACE LAW, *supra* note 25, at 256, 258.

In the air the higher one ascends, the more damage the fall of objects will cause on the earth. If there exists a limit as to the sovereignty of the State over the oceanic space, none exists for the sovereignty of the State over the air space. The right of the subjacent State remains the same whatever may be the distance.³³

Professor Westlake did support "a right of innocent passage for foreign aircraft such as international law recognized for surface vessels through" territorial seas.³⁴ In 1910, Fauchille revised his suggestion by decreasing the vertical limit of state sovereignty to only 500 meters (1,640 feet).³⁵ The same year, Dr. J. F. Lycklama à Nijeholt published a book asserting there was no upper limit on state sovereignty.³⁶ "We therefore conclude that state sovereignty reaches quite as high as the state's interest can reach, the possibility of which but ends at the uttermost limit of the atmosphere."³⁷

In May and June of 1910, "[t]he first diplomatic conference to consider flight regulation met in Paris."³⁸ During the conference, France tried to "avoid a decision on the question of freedom of flight-space or State sovereignty. . . . [France] thus adopted in principle the position which had been taken by Paul Fauchille."³⁹ The United Kingdom recognized full sovereignty rights of states over their flight-space and did not recognize a right of innocent passage.⁴⁰ Germany believed that states had "full and absolute territorial sovereignty in usable space" over their lands, but would have allowed aircraft of a contracting state to take off, land, and fly over other contracting states.⁴¹

³³ *Id.* (quoting Professor Westlake).

³⁴ Cooper, *Air Navigation Conference*, *supra* note 29, at 112.

³⁵ GRIEF, *supra* note 30, at 51; Cooper, *A Study*, *supra* note 31, at 221.

Fauchille since 1901 had been the leading advocate of freedom of flight-space, opposing the principle of State sovereignty. . . . In 1910 he began to seek general acceptance of the formula "air navigation is free" as a compromise. However, he personally never receded from his original 1902 position that "the air is free."

Cooper, *Air Navigation Conference*, *supra* note 29, at 109 n.15.

³⁶ Professor Cooper described Dr. Nijeholt's book as "a far-sighted and now classic treatise on 'Air Sovereignty.'" John Cobb Cooper, *Flight Space and the Satellites*, 7 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 82, 83 (1958).

³⁷ J. F. LYCKLAMA À NIJEHOLT, AIR SOVEREIGNTY 46 (1910). Dr. Nijeholt summarized and critiqued the views of her contemporaries as well, including Fauchille and Westlake. See *id.* at 9-21.

³⁸ Cooper, *Air Navigation Conference*, *supra* note 29, at 105.

³⁹ *Id.* at 108-09.

⁴⁰ *Id.* at 112-13.

⁴¹ *Id.* at 110-11.

Similar to the position of the United States during the drafting of the Chicago Convention in 1944⁴² and today, Germany's position may be explained because

its great technical progress in the design and construction of the zeppelins and other dirigibles for both military and civil use had put it so far ahead of other European powers that it would have much to gain and little to lose by an exchange of the widest possible flight privileges.⁴³

Although the diplomatic conference adjourned without signing a convention, it had completed most of the clauses of a draft convention.⁴⁴ The 1910 conference "first evidenced general international agreement that usable space above the lands and waters of a State is part of the territory of that State" and that no general right of innocent passage through the usable space above a state existed for aircraft.⁴⁵ The conference did not set a vertical limit on state sovereignty.⁴⁶

After the 1910 Paris conference ended without agreement, many European states asserted absolute vertical sovereignty.⁴⁷ Interestingly, although German balloon flights over France prior to 1914 are often discussed, in 1914 Germany cited French military aviators flying over German and Belgian areas as one of its reasons for declaring war on France.⁴⁸ Professor Cooper translated a relevant part of the "little known and seldom read German Declaration of War on France" as:

The German administrative and military authorities have established a certain number of flagrantly hostile acts committed on

⁴² See *infra* note 69 and accompanying text.

⁴³ Cooper, *Air Navigation Conference*, *supra* note 29, at 119.

⁴⁴ *Id.* at 105.

⁴⁵ *Id.*

⁴⁶ *Id.* at 123.

In the French statement on the entry of foreign aircraft a recommendation was made that the convention should include a restriction prohibiting aircraft navigating below a height to be stated in the convention, so as to protect the population against the indiscretions of aircraft and the noise of their motors. The German delegation opposed this proposal and it had no support. The draft convention as approved by the conference and the rules adopted by the First Commission all dealt with flight-space as being subject to uniform regulation at whatever height used. The conference clearly rejected any division of usable space into horizontal zones.

Id.

⁴⁷ John Cobb Cooper, *State Sovereignty in Space: Developments 1910 to 1914*, in COOPER, *EXPLORATIONS IN AEROSPACE LAW*, *supra* note 40, at 125, 126-36.

⁴⁸ *Id.* at 134.

German territory by French military aviators. Several of these have openly violated the neutrality of Belgium by flying over the territory of that country; one has attempted to destroy buildings near Wesel; others have been seen in the district of the Eifel, one has thrown bombs on the railway near Karlsruhe and Nuremberg.⁴⁹

After World War I, the Aeronautical Commission of the Peace Conference in Paris met to examine fundamental principles for air navigation.⁵⁰ The Commission consisted of delegates from many European states as well as Japan, Cuba, Brazil, and the United States.⁵¹ The Commission drafted the Convention Relating to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation, known as the Paris Convention.⁵² Article 1 of the Convention recognized the exclusive sovereignty of all states over the air space above their territory, including above territorial waters.⁵³ The Paris Convention did not define the term "air space."⁵⁴ After the Paris Convention entered into force, an annex was adopted which defined aircraft as "all machines which can derive support in the atmosphere from reactions of the air."⁵⁵ However, according to Professor Cooper, this did not limit a state's vertical sovereignty because "the Paris Convention is not to be construed as meaning that in international law States have territorial rights only in this airspace. The airspace was accepted as part of State territory but no international determination was made as to the regions of space above."⁵⁶

⁴⁹ *Id.*

⁵⁰ See John Cobb Cooper, *U.S. Participation in Drafting Paris Convention 1919*, 18 J. AIR L. & COM. 266 (1951), reprinted in COOPER, *EXPLORATIONS IN AEROSPACE LAW*, *supra* note 25, at 137, 140.

⁵¹ *Id.*

⁵² See generally Convention for the Regulation of Aerial Navigation, Oct. 13, 1919, 11 L.N.T.S. 173 [hereinafter Paris Convention].

⁵³ See *id.* art. 1.

The High Contracting Parties recognize that every Power has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the air space above its territory.

For the purpose of the present Convention, the territory of a State shall be understood as including the national territory, both that of the mother country and of the colonies, and the territorial waters adjacent thereto.

Id.

⁵⁴ See Cooper, *High Altitude Flight*, *supra* note 32, at 259.

⁵⁵ *Id.* (quoting from the annex).

⁵⁶ *Id.*

The Paris Convention did not provide for a right of innocent passage, but it did encourage states to allow innocent passage, saying "[e]ach contracting State undertakes in time of peace to accord freedom of innocent passage above its territory to the aircraft of the other contracting States."⁵⁷ However, apparently the idea of innocent passage was not looked upon favorably; article 15, which provided in part that "every aircraft of a contracting State has the right to cross the air space of another State without landing," was amended in 1929 to make this right conditional.⁵⁸ The new paragraph 4 of article 15 said that "[e]very contracting State may make conditional on its prior authorization the establishment of international airways and the creation and operation of regular international air navigation lines, with or without landing, on its territory."⁵⁹

The right of innocent passage "provided for by Article 2 [was] thus largely limited to civil aircraft used for pleasure or occasional commercial flights."⁶⁰ The Paris Convention was ratified by most European states and "its statement of airspace sovereignty became an accepted part of international law."⁶¹

In 1928 the United States helped draft the Pan American Convention on Commercial Aviation,⁶² known as the Havana Convention, which repeated the Paris Convention's recognition of complete and exclusive sovereignty of a State over airspace above its territory.⁶³ The Havana Convention also provided a similarly limited right of innocent passage,⁶⁴ and "[f]or the operation of scheduled international air services, under the Havana Convention, just as in the case of the Paris Convention, a prior consent was required by the states on the route."⁶⁵

⁵⁷ Paris Convention, *supra* note 52, art. 2.

⁵⁸ See McDUGAL ET AL., *supra* note 20.

⁵⁹ *Id.*

⁶⁰ *Id.*

⁶¹ John Cobb Cooper, *Airspace Rights over the Arctic* [hereinafter Cooper, *Airspace Rights over the Arctic*], in COOPER, EXPLORATIONS IN AEROSPACE LAW, *supra* note 25, at 171, 175.

⁶² See generally Pan American Convention on Commercial Aviation, Feb. 20, 1928, 47 Stat. 1901, 129 L.N.T.S. 225.

⁶³ "The high contracting parties recognize that every state has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the air space above its territory and territorial waters." *Id.* art. 1.

⁶⁴ *Id.* art. 4 ("Each contracting state undertakes in time of peace to accord freedom of innocent passage above its territory to the private aircraft of the other contracting states, provided that the conditions laid down in the present convention are observed.").

⁶⁵ McDUGAL ET AL., *supra* note 20, at 263.

On September 11, 1944, the United States invited its allies and neutral states "to participate in an international civil aviation conference."⁶⁶ Although the U.S.S.R. was invited to attend, and its delegates were en route to attend the conference, they were recalled before arriving without explanation.⁶⁷ The "conference met in Chicago, Illinois, from November 1 to December 7, 1944."⁶⁸ The United States and many people from other states hoped that the convention would negotiate a treaty that would reverse the precedent of the Paris Convention and provide freedom of navigation.⁶⁹ Instead, the resulting treaty, the Convention on International Civil Aviation,⁷⁰ known as the Chicago Convention, reaffirms in article 1 that all states have "complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above [their] territory."⁷¹ There are currently 188 States that are parties to the Chicago Convention.⁷² Professor Cooper, who attended the 1944 Chicago Conference as adviser to the U.S. delegation and served as chairman of one of the two drafting committees, wrote that he "reported out the present article 1 which had been adapted from the Paris Convention [and on] behalf of the drafting committee, he recommended its adoption."⁷³ The Chicago Convention includes the area above a state's territorial waters in that state's territorial airspace.⁷⁴ The Convention does not provide any right of innocent passage,⁷⁵ and scheduled international air services are only allowed with special permission of the contracting states.⁷⁶

⁶⁶ Cooper, *A Study*, *supra* note 31, at 237.

⁶⁷ See John Cobb Cooper, *The Chicago Convention—After Twenty Years*, 19 U. MIAMI L. REV. 333 (1965), in COOPER, EXPLORATIONS IN AEROSPACE LAW, *supra* note 40, at 439, 440. The U.S.S.R. became a party to the Chicago Convention on October 15, 1970. See International Civil Aviation Organization, *Status of Convention on International Civil Aviation Signed at Chicago on 7 December 1944*, <http://www.icao.int/icao/en/leb/chicago.htm> (last visited June 9, 2005) [hereinafter *Status of Chicago Convention*].

⁶⁸ See Cooper, *A Study*, *supra* note 31, at 237.

⁶⁹ See McDUGAL ET AL., *supra* note 20, at 264–65.

⁷⁰ Chicago Convention, *supra* note 23.

⁷¹ See *id.* art. 1.

⁷² See *Status of Chicago Convention*, *supra* note 67.

⁷³ John Cobb Cooper, *Air Law—A Field for International Thinking*, 4 U.N. TRANSP. & COMM. R. 1 (1951), in COOPER, EXPLORATIONS IN AEROSPACE LAW, *supra* note 25, at 1, 8.

⁷⁴ See Chicago Convention, *supra* note 23, art. 2.

⁷⁵ "In order that there would be no more uncertainty as to the exact meaning of the term 'innocent passage,' it was altogether omitted from the Convention." McDUGAL ET AL., *supra* note 20, at 265.

⁷⁶ See Chicago Convention, *supra* note 23, art. 6.

Like the Paris Convention, the Chicago Convention does not define the term "airspace" or its upper limit. According to Professor Cooper:

I can tell you as a matter of unwritten history that the effect, if any, of the [German] V-2 [rocket] on the legal conclusion applicable to flight was not put forward, nor discussed at Chicago. . . . Article I of the Chicago Convention dealing with air space sovereignty was modeled on the Paris Convention. It did not take into consideration the fact that there had been a few rocket flights of V-2's prior to the time of the drafting of the Chicago Convention.⁷⁷

An annex to the Chicago Convention defines an aircraft as "any machine that can derive support in the atmosphere from the reactions of the air other than the reactions of the air against the earth's surface."⁷⁸ Professor Cooper wrote an article in 1956 titled *Legal Problems of Upper Space*⁷⁹ in which one of his conclusions was:

The Chicago Convention contains no definition of "airspace" but it may well be argued that, as it was adapted from the Paris Convention, it deals with no areas of space other than those parts of the atmosphere where the gaseous air is sufficiently dense to support balloons and airplanes.⁸⁰

Therefore, it could be argued that the international recognition of absolute state sovereignty of airspace expressed in article 1 of the Chicago Convention only extends up to the point where flight by conventional aircraft and balloons is possible. However, as Loftus Becker, the legal advisor to the Secretary of State,⁸¹ wrote in 1959,

Even if such international agreements as the Chicago Convention of 1944 be interpreted as conferring "complete and exclu-

⁷⁷ G. Vernon Leopold & Allison L. Scafuri, *Orbital and Super-Orbital Space Flight Trajectories*, 36 U. DET. L.J. 515, 518 n.15 (1959). The German V-2 rocket climbed to an altitude of 60 miles (96.5 kilometers) on its way to its target. See McDUGAL ET AL., *supra* note 33, at 201.

⁷⁸ INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION, AIRCRAFT NATIONALITY AND REGISTRATION MARKS, ANNEX 7 TO THE CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION § 1 (4th ed. 1981). Balloons are considered to be aircraft as well. See *id.*

⁷⁹ John Cobb Cooper, *Legal Problems of Upper Space* [hereinafter Cooper, *Upper Space*], in COOPER, EXPLORATIONS IN AEROSPACE LAW, *supra* note 25, at 268.

⁸⁰ *Id.* at 272.

⁸¹ Loftus Becker was the Legal Advisor to the Secretary of State from June 1957 until August 1959. See U.S. Dep't of State, Legal Advisors, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/po/12106.htm> (last visited June 9, 2005).

sive" sovereignty only within some limit of "air space"—a concept not defined either in the Convention, by lawyers, or by scientists—it should be noted that this does not of itself establish that the United States has no rights above these limits.⁸²

Professor Cooper earlier reached the same conclusion in 1951, writing that "[t]he territory of the State extends upward *at least* as far above the surface as to include a region which can be roughly defined as 'airspace.'"⁸³

Today, access to a foreign state's airspace by aircraft for international commerce can be obtained only through bilateral or multilateral agreement.⁸⁴ There are now many thousand individual bilateral and multilateral agreements in force, which are necessary for airlines to operate international air service. These are negotiated by states and cumulatively represent a great expenditure of time, energy, and treasure that could have been more productively used in other areas.

B. COMPARISON TO THE TERRITORIAL SEA

The problem of defining a state's vertical sovereignty is fundamentally based on the lack of a natural boundary separating air and space. This is similar to the lack of natural boundaries separating "international waters" from a state's "territorial waters." Coastal states historically have made claims to waters adjacent to their territory, called the "territorial sea." The width of states' claims to territorial seas has varied greatly. At least three reasons have been given to justify these claims: state security; customs and commercial supervision of ships; and coastal state's welfare being dependent upon its exclusive enjoyment of the products of the sea in its territorial waters.⁸⁵ The early claims by states to territorial seas of three nautical miles (nm) (3.5 miles or 5.5 kilometers) apparently were based on the maximum range of naval cannons.⁸⁶ The United States has always claimed

⁸² Loftus Becker, *U.S. Foreign Policy and the Development of Law for Outer Space*, JAG J., Feb. 1959, at 4, 7 [hereinafter Becker, *U.S. Foreign Policy*].

⁸³ Cooper, *High Altitude Flight*, *supra* note 32, at 260.

⁸⁴ See McDUGAL ET AL., *supra* note 20, at 268.

⁸⁵ See JOHN TAYLOR MURCHISON, *THE CONTIGUOUS AIR SPACE ZONE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW* 25 (1956).

⁸⁶ *Id.* at 26.

only a limited territorial sea, adopting a three-mile territorial sea in 1793.⁸⁷

In the eighteenth century, the United Kingdom expanded its claimed territorial sea to combat smuggling.⁸⁸ A 1736 Act of Parliament extended jurisdiction to four leagues.⁸⁹ As the smugglers adapted to each new claim, the U.K. responded by increasing its claims further.⁹⁰ In 1794, jurisdiction was extended in some cases up to fifty miles (80 kilometers), and in 1805 it was extended in some cases up to 100 leagues (300 miles or 480 kilometers).⁹¹ Interestingly, throughout this period there is no record of any other state objecting to this infringement on their rights of navigation.⁹² Finally, in the late nineteenth century, the U.K. consolidated all of its customs laws and decreased its territorial sea claims to between one and four leagues.⁹³

In the twentieth century, states claimed territorial seas of varying widths. However, according to Mr. Becker, "by the latter part of the 19th century or the early part of the 20th century, the 3-mile limit was firmly established as customary international law."⁹⁴ In 1958, three conventions were drafted in Geneva codifying various aspects of the law of the sea.⁹⁵ Unfortunately, these conventions did not specify the maximum width of the territorial sea that states could claim.⁹⁶ States continued to claim varying widths for their territorial seas, and some even claimed up to 100 nm (115 miles or 185 kilometers).

⁸⁷ Loftus Becker, Some Political Problems of the Legal Adviser, Address Before the American Society of International Law (Apr. 26, 1958), in 38 DEP'T ST. BULL. 832, 834 (1958) [hereinafter Becker, Political Problems].

⁸⁸ See MURCHISON, *supra* note 85, at 29.

⁸⁹ See *id.* at 31.

⁹⁰ See *id.* at 32.

⁹¹ See *id.* at 32-33.

⁹² See *id.* at 33.

⁹³ See *id.* Note that a marine league equals three miles.

⁹⁴ Becker, Political Problems, *supra* note 87, at 834. See also NIJEHOLT, *supra* note 37, at 18 (asserting that three miles is "the generally adopted breadth of the territorial waters.").

⁹⁵ Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 82; Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, 499 U.N.T.S. 311; Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, 516 U.N.T.S. 205.

⁹⁶ See Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, *supra* note 95, arts. 1-2; John Astley III & Michael N. Schmitt, *The Law of the Sea and Naval Operations*, 42 A.F. L. REV. 119, 121 (1997).

The United Nations sponsored several conferences between 1973 and 1982 to update the 1958 conventions.⁹⁷ These conferences led to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, known as the Law of the Sea Convention, which entered into force in 1994.⁹⁸ The Law of the Sea Convention specifies that states may claim no more than 12 nm (13.8 miles or 22.2 kilometers) for their territorial seas.⁹⁹ A state's sovereignty extends to the air space above the territorial sea,¹⁰⁰ so its territorial airspace does not begin at the coast. The Law of the Sea Convention also allows states to make territorial claims to "historic" bays.¹⁰¹ To qualify as a historic bay, a State must have exercised continuous and open authority over the bay and the authority must be acquiesced to by other states.¹⁰² In 1997, fifteen states made claims to historic bays.¹⁰³ The Convention recognizes a right of innocent passage for all ships through the territorial seas of coastal states.¹⁰⁴ The Convention does not require any prior notice or authorization before exercising the right of innocent passage.¹⁰⁵ The Convention grants all ships and aircraft a right of transit passage through a strait from one part of the high seas (or an economic exclusive zone (EEZ)) to another part of the high seas (or EEZ).¹⁰⁶

The mere existence of a law does not mean it will be followed or uniformly interpreted. Even after the Law of the Sea Convention entered into force, problems still arise over varying claims by states to territorial waters. In 1999, nine states claimed territorial seas extending beyond 12 nm,¹⁰⁷ and Ecuador, El Salvador, Liberia, and Sierra Leone claimed 200 nm (230 miles or

⁹⁷ Astley & Schmitt, *supra* note 96, at 121.

⁹⁸ United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 21 I.L.M. 1245, 1833 U.N.T.S. 396, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (becoming effective on Nov. 16, 1994) [hereinafter the Law of the Sea Convention].

⁹⁹ *Id.* art. 3.

¹⁰⁰ *See id.* art. 2(2); Chicago Convention, *supra* note 23, art. 2.

¹⁰¹ Law of the Sea Convention, *supra* note 98, art. 10(6).

¹⁰² GRIEF, *supra* note 30, at 18.

¹⁰³ *See* Astley & Schmitt, *supra* note 96, at 126.

¹⁰⁴ Law of the Sea Convention, *supra* note 98, arts. 17–26.

¹⁰⁵ *See id.*

¹⁰⁶ *See id.* arts. 37–45.

¹⁰⁷ The Secretary-General, *Oceans and the Law of the Sea: Report of the Secretary-General*, ¶ 86, U.N. Doc. A/54/429 (Sept. 30, 1999) (hereinafter *Oceans and the Law of the Sea*).

370 kilometers) wide territorial seas.¹⁰⁸ Also, the maximum 12 nm width of each state's territorial sea is measured from base-lines that are somewhat difficult to determine.¹⁰⁹ Regarding the right of innocent passage, over twenty-five states require prior permission before exercising the right, and thirteen require prior notification.¹¹⁰ However, overall compliance of states with the Law of the Sea Convention's provisions on the establishment of the outer limits of territorial seas is considered to be "very high."¹¹¹

The various interpretations of the Law of the Sea Convention's provisions can lead to conflict.¹¹² The United States does not recognize any claims to historic bays or claims to territorial seas beyond 12 nm.¹¹³ It demonstrates its lack of recognition of excessive maritime claims by conducting a freedom of navigation program.¹¹⁴ This is done by sending U.S. Navy and Coast Guard ships into the contested waters.¹¹⁵ These actions prevent excessive territorial claims of States from becoming accepted as international norms.¹¹⁶ The freedom of navigation operations have "oftentimes have persuaded States to bring their practices into conformity with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea."¹¹⁷

Before the Law of the Sea Convention entered into force, U.S. President Ronald Reagan expanded the U.S. territorial sea to 12 nm,¹¹⁸ although the United States has not ratified the Law of the Sea Convention.

¹⁰⁸ WILLIAM S. COHEN, U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS app. H (2000) [hereinafter COHEN, 2000 REPORT], available at <http://www.defenselink.mil/execsec/adr2000/>.

¹⁰⁹ See Law of the Sea Convention, *supra* note 98, arts. 3–15.

¹¹⁰ Astley & Schmitt, *supra* note 96, at 132.

¹¹¹ *Oceans and the Law of the Sea*, *supra* note 107, ¶ 85.

¹¹² See *infra* notes 431–449 and accompanying text.

¹¹³ Astley & Schmitt, *supra* note 96, at 126.

¹¹⁴ See COHEN, 2000 REPORT, *supra* note 108, app. H. The most widely known United States freedom of navigation operation involved U.S. Navy operations in the Gulf of Sidra off of the coast of Libya in the 1980s. See GRIEF, *supra* note 30, at 18.

¹¹⁵ See Astley & Schmitt, *supra* note 96, at 126.

¹¹⁶ WILLIAM S. COHEN, U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS app. H (2001) [hereinafter COHEN, 2001 REPORT], available at <http://www.dod.mil/execsec/adr2001/index.html>.

¹¹⁷ *Id.* Like the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Air Force conducts a freedom of navigation program in the air. Air Force Doctrine Document 2-3, *Military Operations Other Than War*, July 3, 2000, at 18, available at <http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/afdc/dd/afdd2-3/afdd2-3.pdf>.

¹¹⁸ See Proclamation No. 5928, 54 Fed. Reg. 777 (Dec. 27, 1988).

The U.S.S.R. is a good example of a state that has repeatedly made maritime claims that do not comport with international law.¹¹⁹ In 1927, the U.S.S.R. established an official territorial sea of 12 nm.¹²⁰ Although by 1961 the U.S.S.R. had ratified three of the four Law of the Sea Conventions, "[t]he Soviet Union maintain[ed] that nothing in international law require[d] a nation to adhere to a particular width of territorial sea belt or to use any particular method of measurement of the base line from which a territorial belt extends seaward."¹²¹ The U.S.S.R. abused three concepts of international law to unilaterally annex "over three million square kilometers of the high seas" between 1931 and 1961.¹²² For example, in 1957 the U.S.S.R. declared the "Bay of Peter the Great" near Vladivostok to be a historic bay and said no foreign ships would be allowed to enter.¹²³ According to Mr. William Harben, a U.S. Department of State Foreign Service Officer,¹²⁴ "[t]he 'Bay' of Peter the Great is a rather shallow indentation and does not meet the 'semicircle' definitional test."¹²⁵ The United States protested this declaration in a series of diplomatic notes, concluding in one that the United States "reserves its right to take such action as it deems necessary to protect each and all of its right in that area."¹²⁶

C. STATE POSITIONS CONCERNING VERTICAL SOVEREIGNTY

In the years since the drafting of the Chicago Convention, states have taken different positions on the extent of vertical sovereignty and definitions of their national airspace. There is no consensus today.

Australia

In 2002, Australia began reforming its National Airspace System (NAS) based on international standards as applied in the United States, but with a defined upper limit of 60,000 feet

¹¹⁹ See William N. Harben, *Soviet Attitudes and Practices Concerning Maritime Waters*, 15 JAG J. 149, 153–154 (1961).

¹²⁰ *Id.* at 149.

¹²¹ *Id.*

¹²² *Id.* at 150. The article of Mr. Harben includes a map showing all of the maritime claims of the U.S.S.R. See *id.* at 151.

¹²³ See *id.* at 152.

¹²⁴ See *id.* at 149.

¹²⁵ See *id.* at 152.

¹²⁶ See U.S. Note to U.S.S.R. (Mar. 6, 1958), reprinted in 38 DEP'T ST. BULL. 461 (1958).

(18.3 kilometers) for Class A airspace.¹²⁷ For space launch licensing purposes, Australia's Space Activities Act of 1998 defines a space object as a payload carried to or back from "an area beyond the distance of 100 kilometers above mean sea level."¹²⁸ These acts do not mean, however, that Australia is renouncing any claims of sovereignty it may have to the area above 60,000 feet or even above 100 kilometers (62 miles).

The Federal Republic of Germany

In 1961, Germany amended its Law Concerning Air Navigation of January 10, 1959, to include spacecraft and rockets in its definition of "aircraft."¹²⁹ The law does not define the upper extent of this airspace.¹³⁰

The Russian Federation and the U.S.S.R.

Prior to the launch of Sputnik on October 4, 1957, U.S.S.R. attorneys asserted that the sovereignty of a state extended to unlimited height.¹³¹ After Sputnik, U.S.S.R. authors rejected the prior Soviet writings and argued that no state could claim sovereignty in space.¹³² Responding to unofficial claims that Sputnik had violated the territory of other states, Dr. G. Zadorozhni, a Soviet lawyer, wrote that Sputnik did not "penetrate the air space over any territories; rather it is these territories which run

¹²⁷ See Stephen Angus, *National Airspace System Implementation Group Concept* (Version 5.0), available at http://www.dotars.gov.au/aviation/airspace_reform/doc/nas_concept.doc. See also National Airspace System Implementation Group, *Air-space for Everyone*, AIRSPACE ADVISER No. 1.1 (Oct. 2003) 16, 18, available at http://www.dotars.gov.au/airspace_reform/pdf/airspace.pdf.

¹²⁸ Space Activities Act, 1998, § 8 (Austl.), available at [http://www.comlaw.gov.au/comlaw/Legislation/ActCompilation1.nsf/0/9ACAE6DB9C35F901CA256F7100526E2D/\\$file/SpaceAct98.pdf](http://www.comlaw.gov.au/comlaw/Legislation/ActCompilation1.nsf/0/9ACAE6DB9C35F901CA256F7100526E2D/$file/SpaceAct98.pdf).

¹²⁹ See Law Amending the Law Concerning Air Navigation (6th Amendment), art. 1(b), Jul. 25, 1964, reprinted in STAFF OF S. COMM. ON COMMERCE, 89TH CONG., 1 AIR LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD 777 (Comm. Print 1965). The amended article 1(2) provided, "Aircraft shall be deemed airplanes, helicopters, dirigibles, glider planes, free and captive balloons, kites, flight models and other instrumentalities intended for the use of the airspace, in particular spacecraft, rockets and similar flight instrumentalities."

¹³⁰ *Id.*

¹³¹ McDOUGAL ET AL., *supra* note 20, at 234–35. However, a widely cited article on this subject by two U.S.S.R. authors must be considered in light of the fact that it was written in direct response to U.S. Secretary of State Dulles' argument [*see infra* notes 145–147 and accompanying text] that U.S. balloon flights over the U.S.S.R. did not violate its sovereignty. See McDOUGAL ET AL., *supra* note 33, at 235 n.120.

¹³² See McDOUGAL ET AL., *supra* note 20, at 235.

under . . . the orbit of the satellite's movement."¹³³ But the U.S.S.R. continued to claim vertical sovereignty with no defined upper limit.¹³⁴

South Africa

South Africa's laws apparently leave a gap between the areas defined as airspace and outer-space.¹³⁵ Its aviation act mirrors the definition in annex 7 to the Chicago Convention,¹³⁶ apparently limiting its territorial airspace to the maximum height at which aircraft can "derive support from the atmosphere."¹³⁷ However, a separate law defines "outer space" as "the space above the surface of the earth from a height at which it is in practice possible to operate an object in an orbit around the earth."¹³⁸

The United Kingdom

During an October 1999 session of the U.K. House of Lords, Lord Macdonald of Tradeston (then the Minister of State, Department of the Environment, Transport, and the Regions) said that "the UK does not have a working definition of the upper limit of UK airspace, but for practical purposes the limit is con-

¹³³ *200th Circuit By Satellite To-Day*, TIMES (London), Oct. 18, 1957, at 7 (translating an article in the newspaper Soviet Russia); Leopold & Scafuri, *supra* note 77, at 528 (also quoting Dr. Zadorozhni).

¹³⁴ According to the Air Code of Dec. 29, 1961,

The complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace of the U.S.S.R. shall belong to the U.S.S.R.

Airspace of the U.S.S.R. shall be deemed to be the airspace above the land and water territory of the U.S.S.R. including the space above the territorial waters as determined by the laws of the U.S.S.R. and by international treaties concluded by the U.S.S.R.

Air Code, Dec. 29, 1961, art. 1 (U.S.S.R.), *reprinted in* STAFF OF S. COMM. ON COMMERCE, 89TH CONG., 2 AIR LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD 2545 (Comm. Print 1965).

¹³⁵ See South Africa Department of Transportation, *White Paper on National Policy on Airports and Airspace Management* (1997), available at <http://www.transport.gov.za/library/docs/white-paper/airport-wp.html>.

¹³⁶ See INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION, AIRCRAFT NATIONALITY AND REGISTRATION MARKS, ANNEX 7 TO THE CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION § 1 (4th ed. 1981).

¹³⁷ See South Africa Department of Transportation, *supra* note 135 (citing the Aviation Act 74 of 1962 (S. Africa)).

¹³⁸ Space Affairs Act, 84 of 1993 art. 1 (S. Africa), available at http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/SpaceLaw/national/south_africa/space_affairs_act_1993E.html.

sidered to be *at least as high* as any aircraft can fly.”¹³⁹ So although the U.K. has apparently set no upper limit to its sovereignty, it also is not limiting any future claims it may assert.¹⁴⁰

The United States

Although the United States agreed with the principle of airspace sovereignty expressed in the Paris Convention, the United States signed it but did not ratify it.¹⁴¹ In the Air Commerce Act of 1926, the United States claimed “complete sovereignty of the airspace over the lands and waters of the United States.”¹⁴² The United States ratified the Havana Convention in 1931¹⁴³ and the Chicago Convention in 1946.¹⁴⁴

The United States’ position on the vertical extent of state sovereignty changed repeatedly in the 1950s and 60s. In 1956, during a news conference discussing U.S.S.R. protests of U.S. high-altitude balloons violating U.S.S.R. airspace, U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles said “the question of the ownership of upper air is a disputable question. . . . What the legal position is, I wouldn’t feel in a position to answer because I do not believe that the legal position has even been codified”¹⁴⁵ Later in the same news conference, Secretary Dulles answered a question

¹³⁹ 5 *Parl. Deb., H.L.* (5th ser.) (1999), available at <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199899/ldhansrd/vo991021/text/91021w03.htm> (emphasis added).

¹⁴⁰ See *id.*

¹⁴¹ See Cooper, *Airspace Rights over the Arctic*, *supra* note 61, at 175.

¹⁴² See An Act To Encourage and Regulate the Use of Aircraft in Commerce, and for Other Purposes, Pub. L. No. 69-254, § 6, 44 Stat. 568 (1926), *repealed by* Pub. L. No. 85-726, § 1401(a), 72 Stat. 731, 806 (1958).

¹⁴³ See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1776-1949, at 698 (1969). The United States renounced the Havana Convention in 1947 after ratifying the Chicago Convention. See *id.*

¹⁴⁴ See generally *Status of Chicago Convention*, *supra* note 67.

¹⁴⁵ *Transcript of the Record of News Conference Held by Dulles*, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1956, at 10. Although the quote above appears to be a definitive statement, Secretary Dulles qualified it by arguing that the balloons were not interfering with aircraft rather than discussing sovereignty, saying that there is a “recognized practice to avoid putting up into the air anything which could interfere with any normal use of the air by anybody else.” *Id.* The next day Secretary Dulles said the United States’ position was that “the legal status of the upper air and the spaces beyond it [was] still undetermined, and that recognition of any national claim there might raise questions as to the legality of other modern media, such as radio waves and even the projected space satellite.” *The Balloon Controversy*, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1956, at 30.

by saying, "Yes, I think that we feel [that the United States has the right to send balloons at a certain height anywhere around the globe], although . . . there is no clear international law on the subject."¹⁴⁶ Secretary Dulles was asked the approximate height at which a balloon leaves the area of sovereignty, and he responded:

I just can't answer that question. I am very sorry. But it is the same problem that we get on a minor scale when you deal with a question as to whether a man who has a house near an airfield has a right to prevent planes flying over his piece of land and his home. . . . [A]lthough certainly everybody admits that if you own a piece of land, you do control the air a certain distance up. But precisely what the distance is has never been decided, even in domestic law. When you get into international law, the problem is also obscure. I don't know how high a balloon has to go before you get out of the bounds of sovereignty, so to speak.¹⁴⁷

Shortly after Sputnik's launch, several U.S. Air Force staff officers thought the United States should protest Sputnik's orbit over the country as a violation of sovereignty, but the United States did not file a protest.¹⁴⁸ In May 1958, Mr. Becker, although careful to say he was not taking a position, suggested to Congress that state sovereignty might extend up to 10,000 miles.¹⁴⁹ In 1962, U.S. Air Force Major General John M. Reynolds, the Vice-Director of the Joint Staff, expressed the U.S. De-

¹⁴⁶ *Transcript of the Record of News Conference Held by Dulles, supra* note 145, at 10.

¹⁴⁷ *Id.*

¹⁴⁸ See DELBERT R. TERRILL, JR., *THE AIR FORCE ROLE IN DEVELOPING INTERNATIONAL OUTER SPACE LAW* 27 (1999), available at <http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/aul/aupress/Books/Terrill/terrill.pdf>. Ultimately, the U.S. Air Force did not urge the U.S. State Department to protest because the U.S.S.R.'s orbiting of Sputnik helped to establish a legal norm of freedom of outer space. See *id.*

¹⁴⁹ See Loftus Becker, *Major Aspects of the Problem of Outer Space*, Address Before the Special Senate Committee on Space and Astronautics (May 14, 1958), in 38 DEP'T ST. BULL. 962, 966 (1958) [hereinafter Becker, *Problem of Outer Space*].

I think it important to note, however, that one of the suggestions that has been made in this regard is that the airspace should be defined to include that portion of space above the earth in which there is any atmosphere. I am informed that astronomically the earth's atmosphere extends 10,000 miles above its surface.

It follows that it would be perfectly rational for us to maintain that under the Chicago Convention the sovereignty of the U.S. extends 10,000 miles from the surface of the earth, an area which would comprehend the area in which all of the satellites up to this point have entered.

partment of Defense's position on an international agreement on a boundary between air and space as being "neither necessary nor desirable at this time. Should a finite boundary be forced upon us, 20 miles or less would be least disadvantageous."¹⁵⁰ At some point in the 1960s, the U.S. State Department proposed encouraging an international agreement defining outer space, but the U.S. Air Force convinced the U.S. Department of Defense to resist this idea, and apparently the U.S. State Department never proceeded.¹⁵¹

After examining U.S. laws, Professor Cooper concluded in 1965 that the United States claimed "complete, absolute and exclusive jurisdiction to control all types of flight in its territorial airspace zone" but that the United States had not specified the upper boundary of its sovereign airspace zone.¹⁵² The United States currently claims "exclusive sovereignty of airspace of the United States," and the term "airspace" is not further defined.¹⁵³ In the subsection defining the "use of airspace," use is linked to "aircraft."¹⁵⁴ But the term "aircraft" is broadly defined as "any contrivance invented, used, or designed to navigate, or fly in, the air."¹⁵⁵ This definition is broad enough to include rockets and other high altitude vehicles that do not rely on aerodynamic lift to "fly."¹⁵⁶ In various sections of the U.S. Code, the term "outer space" is used in the definition of other terms but is not itself specifically defined.¹⁵⁷

In 2001, the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) Office of Associate Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation (CST) published a concept of operations for commercial space transportation in the U.S. National Air Space System (NAS).¹⁵⁸ It was designed "in anticipation of the evolution of a

¹⁵⁰ TERRILL, *supra* note 148, at 53.

¹⁵¹ *See id.* at 54.

¹⁵² John Cobb Cooper, *Contiguous Zones in Aerospace—Preventive and Protective Jurisdiction*, 7 A.F. L. REV. 15 (1965) [hereinafter Cooper, *Contiguous Zones*], reprinted in COOPER, EXPLORATIONS IN AEROSPACE LAW, *supra* note 25, at 316, 319–20. *See also* Becker, Problem of Outer Space, *supra* note 149, at 966 ("The U.S. Government has not recognized any top or upper limit to its sovereignty.").

¹⁵³ 49 U.S.C. § 40103(a)(1) (2006).

¹⁵⁴ *See* 49 U.S.C. § 40103(b) (2006).

¹⁵⁵ 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(6) (2006).

¹⁵⁶ *See id.*

¹⁵⁷ *See, e.g.*, 15 U.S.C. § 5802 (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 14701 (2006); 49 U.S.C. §§ 70101, 70102 (2006).

¹⁵⁸ OFFICE OF ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION IN THE NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM VERSION 2.0

NAS environment in the 21st century that fully integrates commercial space operations.”¹⁵⁹ It notes that “[h]istorically, commercial launch operations have occurred at coastal federal ranges utilizing only ELVs [expendable launch vehicles]. As a result, these space operations have had minimal impact on NAS operations due to their infrequent occurrence and offshore trajectories.”¹⁶⁰ However, in the future,

[c]hanges in the magnitude and complexity of space operations will place new demands on the NAS as vehicles in route to and from earth orbit and beyond transition through airspace that is currently the near exclusive domain of aviation traffic. . . . [T]he expected increase in frequency of commercial launches and re-entries, from a broad range of locations, in the U.S. will contribute substantially to competition for airspace amongst NAS users. Therefore, the FAA must now consider a ‘Space and Air Traffic Management System’ (SATMS) that equitably supports both the evolving commercial space transportation industry and the mature and continuously growing aviation industry in a systematic, integrated manner. Thus, the SATMS represents an evolutionary expansion of the U.S. air traffic management system to encompass the people, infrastructure, policies, procedures, rules, and regulations necessary to fully integrate space and aviation operations under a single infrastructure.¹⁶¹

One part of the plan anticipates an eventual ceiling on the U.S. NAS.¹⁶² This would be done to “demarcate the FAA’s operational responsibilities.”¹⁶³ No agency is specified to handle traffic control above the NAS, and the space vehicle operator is responsible for safety of navigation.¹⁶⁴ Although the FAA is considering defining an upper limit to the U.S. NAS, this limit

(2001), *available at* http://faa.gov/airports_airtraffic/air_traffic/satms/media/conops_narrative_v2.pdf.

¹⁵⁹ *Id.* § 1.

¹⁶⁰ *Id.* § 1.1.

¹⁶¹ *Id.*

¹⁶² *See id.* § 2.3. An earlier version of this concept of operations anticipated setting a vertical limit on the U.S. NAS by 2005. *See* OFFICE OF ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION IN THE NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM IN 2005 § 2.3 (1999), *available at* http://www.spacefuture.com/archive/concept_of_operations_in_the_national_airspace_system_in_2005.shtml.

¹⁶³ OFFICE OF ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, *supra* note 162, § 2.3.

¹⁶⁴ *See id.* § 2.3 n.3.

would not preclude the United States from continuing to claim sovereignty above that point.

Interestingly, for at least the limited purpose of defining the qualifications of an astronaut, the U.S. Air Force defines "space" as the area 50 miles (80.4 kilometers) above the Earth's surface in a 2003 regulation.¹⁶⁵

III. CHAPTER II: NEED FOR DEFINITION

A. TECHNOLOGIES DRIVING DELINEATION

As early as the 1960s, there were many proposals for "space planes."¹⁶⁶ These created potential legal issues that were not yet resolved by international law. However, only one of these, the U.S. Space Shuttle, is actually operational, and therefore, many of the potential legal issues never materialized. Elizabeth Kelly provides a detailed review of space plane experiments and proposals.¹⁶⁷

The current ideas for vehicles operating in near space are more diverse than a pure space plane. They include relatively low-cost suborbital vehicles capable of providing short flights for tourists, vehicles operating at high altitude with intercontinental ranges, and autonomous long-endurance high altitude vehicles used to conduct surveillance or as communications platforms. Some of these vehicles have moved beyond paper and have demonstrated their capabilities.

Space Tourism

On October 4, 2004, on the 47th anniversary of the launch of Sputnik, SpaceShipOne, a private vehicle designed in the United States, won the Ansari X-Prize after ascending to 367,463 feet (69.6 miles or 112 kilometers).¹⁶⁸ This is 13,000 feet higher than the previous "unofficial" record set by NASA's X-15 pro-

¹⁶⁵ See Air Force Instruction 11-402, *Aviation and Parachutist Service, Aeronautical Ratings and Badges*, July 29, 2003, para. 2.3.2, available at <http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/af/11/af11-402/af11-402.pdf>.

¹⁶⁶ See Elizabeth Kelly, *The Spaceplane: The Catalyst for Resolution of the Boundary and "Space Object" Issues in the Law of Outer Space?* 7-28 (1998) (unpublished LL.M. thesis, McGill University (Montreal)) (on file with the McGill University Nahum Gelber Law Library).

¹⁶⁷ *Id.*

¹⁶⁸ Michael A. Dornheim, *SpaceShipWon: FAA Administrator Hints Spaceships May Be Treated Like Experimental Aircraft*, AV. WK. & SPACE TECH., Oct. 11, 2004, at 34 [hereinafter Dornheim, *SpaceShipWon*].

gram.¹⁶⁹ During the flight, SpaceShipOne accelerated to Mach 3.09 on ascent and Mach 3.26 during descent.¹⁷⁰ Although the vehicle reached a high altitude and supersonic speed, SpaceShipOne was not designed for long distance travel: it descends almost vertically, traveling no more than 3 miles (4.8 kilometers) horizontally.¹⁷¹ A short video of a flight of SpaceShipOne is available on the internet.¹⁷²

SpaceShipOne was designed and constructed by Burt Rutan and his company, Scaled Composites.¹⁷³ SpaceShipOne is dropped from a special carrier aircraft, called White Knight, also designed by Scaled Composites.¹⁷⁴ This allows SpaceShipOne to save weight by only carrying enough fuel to power it through the less dense layers of the atmosphere.¹⁷⁵ White Knight released SpaceShipOne at 47,000 feet (14.3 kilometers).¹⁷⁶ The entire program cost approximately \$25 million.¹⁷⁷

Although SpaceShipOne was designed specifically to the requirements of the X-Prize¹⁷⁸ and only had seats for three people, Virgin Galactic recently invested \$100 million to develop a larger version of the vehicle capable of carrying five passengers

¹⁶⁹ *Id.* The maximum altitude obtained by an X-15 was 354,200 feet (67.1 miles, or 108 kilometers). Kelly, *supra* note 166, at 8.

¹⁷⁰ Dornheim, *SpaceShipWon*, *supra* note 168.

¹⁷¹ Michael A. Dornheim, *Affordable Spaceship*, AV. WK. & SPACE TECH., Apr. 21, 2003, at 64.

¹⁷² See The Discovery Channel, *The Race for Space* <http://media.dsc.discovery.com/convergence/raceforspace/videogallery/videoplayer2.html> (last visited May 25, 2005).

¹⁷³ See Dornheim, *SpaceShipWon*, *supra* note 168.

¹⁷⁴ *Id.*

¹⁷⁵ See WILLIAM L. SPACY II, DOES THE UNITED STATES NEED SPACE-BASED WEAPONS? 79 & n.18 (1999). See also Robert Zubrin & Mitchell Burnside Clapp, *Aviation's Next Great Leap: Rocket-Powered Aircraft that Can Travel at Hypersonic Speeds*, TECH. REV., Jan. 11, 1998, at 30.

Space launch vehicles are typically *staged* to reduce overhead costs. . . . [M]ost of the size of a space launch vehicle is set by fuel needs, which are enormous for *any* launch vehicle. Once the fuel is exhausted, there's no need to drag along the big empty tanks to orbit, so a space launch vehicle stacks several rockets on top of one another. Each rocket stage falls away when it burns out, reducing the structure that is carried into space.

Simon P. Worden & John E. Shaw, *Whither Space Power? Forging a Strategy for the New Century* 76 (2002), available at http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/aul/aupress/catalog/fairchild_papers/Worden_Shaw_P26.htm.

¹⁷⁶ Dornheim, *SpaceShipWon*, *supra* note 168.

¹⁷⁷ *Id.*

¹⁷⁸ "X Prize rules require that the craft carry 270 kilograms (595 pounds) of payload, including the pilot." *Id.*

and crew for commercial space flights.¹⁷⁹ The Mojave Airport in Palmdale, California, the launch site for SpaceShipOne, has been licensed by the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration to be a space launch facility.¹⁸⁰ The successful flights of SpaceShipOne have helped to lower the threshold of space, at least to the public—many people now think that space begins at an altitude of 62 miles (100 kilometers).¹⁸¹ Many legal scholars would also agree that this altitude is above the vertical limit of a state's sovereign air space.¹⁸² Although SpaceShipOne is probably the most publicly-known commercial space tourist application, several other companies are also trying to develop vehicles for space tourism.¹⁸³

HyperSoar

HyperSoar is a concept developed by the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.¹⁸⁴ It would be powered by rocket-based combined-cycle (RBCC) engines,¹⁸⁵ one component of which is a supersonic combustion ramjet (scramjet).¹⁸⁶ It would take off

¹⁷⁹ Michael A. Dornheim, *Sir Space Tourist; Virgin Galactic Eyes Follow-on Generation Going to Orbit and Around the Moon*, AV. WK. & SPACE TECH., Oct. 4, 2004, at 30.

¹⁸⁰ OFFICE OF COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 2005 U.S. COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION DEVELOPMENTS AND CONCEPTS: VEHICLES, TECHNOLOGIES, AND SPACEPORTS 37 (2005), available at http://ast.faa.gov/files/pdf/2005_dev_con.pdf; Alan Boyle, *Amazon Founder Unveils Space Center Plans*, MSNBC.COM, Jan. 13, 2005, <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6822763/>.

¹⁸¹ See Peter Pae, *Rocket Takes 1st Prize of a New Space Race*, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2004, at A1 (noting SpaceShipOne climbed "well past the 62-mile-high boundary that is widely considered the frontier between the Earth's atmosphere and outer space").

¹⁸² See, e.g., Bin Cheng, *The Legal Regime of Airspace and Outer Space: The Boundary Problem*, V ANNALS OF AIR & SPACE L. 323 (1980) [hereinafter Cheng, *The Boundary Problem*], reprinted in BIN CHENG, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW 425, 451 (1997) [hereinafter CHENG, SPACE LAW]. While not precisely defining the limit of national sovereignty, Professor Bin Cheng writes that above 68 miles (110 kilometers), "one is definitely in outer space, according to *lex lata*." See *id.*


¹⁸³ See OFFICE OF COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, *supra* note 180, at 18–22; Max Boot, *Commentary, Space, the Final Free Market*, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2004, at B13; Boyle, *supra* note 209.

¹⁸⁴ Jefferson Morris, *Space Plane "Dream" Still Alive at DARPA, Tether Says*, AEROSPACE DAILY, Oct. 24, 2003, at 5 [hereinafter Morris, *Space Plane*].

¹⁸⁵ See William B. Scott, *Airbreathing HyperSoar Would "Bounce" on Upper Atmosphere*, AV. WK. & SPACE TECH., Sept. 7, 1998, at 126 [hereafter Scott, *HyperSoar*].

¹⁸⁶ On November 16, 2004, NASA successfully tested the X-43A which was designed to test a scramjet engine. *Hypersonic Plane Breaks Speed Record*, MSNBC.COM, Nov. 16, 2004, <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6504898/>.

horizontally from a standard 10,000 foot (3 kilometers) runway.¹⁸⁷ After accelerating to Mach 10 and climbing to about 130,000 feet (25 miles or 40 kilometers)¹⁸⁸ its engines would be turned off and it would coast up to an altitude of 40 miles (64 kilometers) or more.¹⁸⁹ The vehicle would then descend back into denser air, to an altitude of around 20 miles (32 kilometers), where aerodynamic lift is possible.¹⁹⁰ It would then restart its engines to start the process over and continue doing this repeatedly to “skip” along the upper atmosphere.¹⁹¹ About 2.5 cycles would cover approximately 620 miles (1000 kilometers).¹⁹² A flight from Chicago to Toyko, approximately 6290 miles (10,100 kilometers), could be completed in eighteen cycles and only seventy-two minutes.¹⁹³



Although the idea behind HyperSoar, also called “periodic hypersonic cruise,” has been around for over forty years,¹⁹⁴ the de-

¹⁸⁷ See Scott, *HyperSoar*, *supra* note 185.

¹⁸⁸ *Id.*

¹⁸⁹ Christian Lowe & Nathaniel Levine, *Corps Has Its Sights Set on Space; Hypersonic Aircraft Offers New Deployment Possibilities*, MARINE CORPS TIMES, Aug. 25, 2003, at 18.

¹⁹⁰ *Id.*

¹⁹¹ See *id.*

¹⁹² Scott, *HyperSoar*, *supra* note 185.

¹⁹³ Ann Parker, *Bringing Hypersonic Flight down to Earth*, SCI. & TECH. REV., Jan.–Feb. 2000, at 21, available at http://www.llnl.gov/str/pdfs/01_00.3.pdf.

¹⁹⁴ Apparently the idea of skipping along the upper atmosphere has existed since the dawn of space flight. See Spencer M. Beresford, *Surveillance Aircraft and Satellites: A Problem of International Law*, 27 J. AIR L. & COM. 107, 109 (1960) (describing a “skip rocket” that would “alternately descend from outer space into the atmosphere, and then turn upward into outer space, like a flat stone skipping over the surface of a pond”).

sign of HyperSoar is unique according to its developer.¹⁹⁵ He claims "better performance, lower g-loads, efficient heat management and reduced technical risk."¹⁹⁶ Accordingly, this makes the design more practical than other "transatmospheric" vehicle concepts, such as "Germany's Sanger, the U.S. X-20B DynaSoar, X-30 National Aero Space Plane and the Air Force's Boost Glide Vehicle and military spaceplane."¹⁹⁷ One problem avoided by periodic hypersonic cruise is the extreme heat generated by friction during high-speed flight in the atmosphere.¹⁹⁸ Heat buildup killed most earlier designs for hypersonic travel.¹⁹⁹ For example, during NASA's recent test of the X-43A, the test vehicle flew at approximately 110,000 feet (20.8 miles or 33.5 kilometers) at a maximum speed of Mach 9.6 for only 20 seconds, but it reached a temperature of about 3,000 degrees Fahrenheit (1650 degrees Celsius).²⁰⁰ HyperSoar would avoid this problem because when coasting during its ballistic arcs, it will be able to radiate most of the heat generated during flight in the atmosphere into space.²⁰¹

Research on the HyperSoar concept is being funded by the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) under a program called "Force Application and Launch from the Continental U.S.," or FALCON.²⁰² The FALCON program is split into two parts: a hypersonic cruise vehicle (HCV) (a version of the HyperSoar concept) and the common aero vehicle (CAV) (an unpowered, maneuverable, hypersonic glide vehicle capable of carrying about 1,000 pounds of munitions or other payload).²⁰³ Although funding was decreased for the CAV portion of the program in 2004,²⁰⁴ the first flight of the HCV is

¹⁹⁵ See Scott, *HyperSoar*, *supra* note 185.

¹⁹⁶ *Id.*

¹⁹⁷ *Id.*

¹⁹⁸ See Parker, *supra* note 181, at 21.

¹⁹⁹ See *id.*

²⁰⁰ See *Hypersonic Plane Breaks Speed Record*, *supra* note 186.

²⁰¹ See Scott, *HyperSoar*, *supra* note 185, at 126.

²⁰² Morris, *Space Plane*, *supra* note 184, at 5; *Defense Watch*, DEF. DAILY, Oct. 27, 2003.

²⁰³ See DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY, FORCE APPLICATION AND LAUNCH FROM CONUS (FALCON) BROAD AGENCY ANNOUNCEMENT 1 (July 29, 2003), available at http://www.darpa.mil/tto/falcon/FALCON_PIP_FINAL.pdf; Morris, *Space Plane*, *supra* note 202, at 5.

²⁰⁴ Jefferson Morris, *Analyst: Space Weapon Proponents Need to Make Better Case*, AEROSPACE DAILY & DEF. REP., Aug. 5, 2004, at 1.

scheduled for 2009.²⁰⁵ The U.S. Air Force and DARPA awarded \$8.3 million to Lockheed Martin Aeronautics for prototypes for the six-month second phase of the HCV program.²⁰⁶ Lockheed could receive an additional \$97 million during a thirty-month phase IIb to complete detailed design, fabrication, and flight-test of a hypersonic technology test vehicle.²⁰⁷

The U.S. Air Force is preparing an environmental study for a proposed hypersonic cruise corridor to test a hypersonic vehicle.²⁰⁸ The study examines the environmental impacts associated with the proposed establishment of flight corridors for testing an air-launched, hypersonic vehicle that would land at Edwards Air Force Base in California.²⁰⁹

If HyperSoar, or something like it, works and is available for commercial transport, it could be highly profitable.

An Aviation Industries Assn. modeling standard predicted a HyperSoar-type vehicle would generate 10 times the daily revenue of a subsonic aircraft, but would cost twice as much to operate, primarily due to the handling and consumption of liquid hydrogen fuel. Theoretically, that would still yield a profit five times higher than the subsonic alternative, once a mature HyperSoar infrastructure was in place. However, few, if any, commercial firms could afford the necessary development costs, proponents admitted.²¹⁰

However, past predictions about operational costs in this realm have proven unreliable: the cost per launch of the space shuttle was expected to be \$10 - \$12 million but is now more than \$450 million.²¹¹ Mission turnaround time for the space shuttle was expected to be a few days but is now a few months.²¹²

²⁰⁵ See DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY, *supra* note 232, at 6 fig. 2.1; Morris, *Space Plane*, *supra* note 184, at 5.

²⁰⁶ See Press Release, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, DARPA and Air Force Award Falcon Phase II Task 2 Effort (Aug. 5, 2004), *available at* http://www.darpa.mil/body/news/2004/pdf/falcon_ph2_t2.pdf.

²⁰⁷ See *id.*

²⁰⁸ See Christopher Smith, *Secret Dugway Role May Expand*, SALT LAKE TRIB., Jan. 18, 2005.

²⁰⁹ AIR FORCE FLIGHT TEST CTR., U.S. AIR FORCE, DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT FOR HYPERSONIC CORRIDORS AT EDWARDS AIR FORCE BASE 1 (Nov. 2004) (on file with author). The environmental assessment is being extensively redrafted based on comments received. Email from Larry Hagenauer, TYBRIN Corporation, to Dean Reinhardt, U.S. Air Force (Feb. 23, 2005) (on file with author).

²¹⁰ Scott, *HyperSoar*, *supra* note 185.

²¹¹ See Boot, *supra* note 183.

²¹² See *id.*

Other High-Altitude Vehicles

Balloons provided the first means of human air travel. They also were an early driving force behind the development of air law. In World War I, rigid airships called zeppelins which could travel at what was then considered to be high altitude were used by Germany to launch attacks on the United Kingdom.²¹³

During World War II, Japan demonstrated a surprisingly advanced understanding of the jet stream by launching balloons against the U.S. mainland.²¹⁴ The balloons were constructed of mulberry paper and had barometers to sense their altitude and trigger the release of ballast when the balloons dropped below the proper altitude during their drift to the United States.²¹⁵ Traveling between 30,000 and 35,000 feet (9.1 and 10.7 kilometers), the balloons could cross the Pacific Ocean and reach North America in about seventy hours.²¹⁶ They carried relatively small incendiary bombs and high explosive bombs and were expected to start forest fires and cause fear in the United States.²¹⁷ More than 9,000 of the balloons were released, and six people in the United States were killed by them.²¹⁸

In the 1950s, the U.S. military had several programs that worked on manned high-altitude balloons.²¹⁹ These were used to gain knowledge of the affects of high-altitude flight on humans, information that proved very valuable for manned space flight.²²⁰

²¹³ See U.S. Centennial of Flight Commission, *The Zeppelin*, http://www.centennialofflight.gov/essay/Lighter_than_air/zeppelin/LTA8.htm (last visited June 8, 2005). The first zeppelin raid on London occurred on May 31, 1915, and the zeppelin was able to fly higher than U.K. and French fighter aircraft. See *id.* One article reported that zeppelins were able to reach an altitude of 13,000 feet. See *French Airmen's Exploits: Fight With a Zeppelin at 13,000 Feet*, *TIMES* (London), Apr. 27, 1916, at 6.

²¹⁴ See Cecilia Rasmussen, *Los Angeles, Then and Now*, *L.A. TIMES*, Nov. 3, 2002, at 2.

²¹⁵ *Id.*

²¹⁶ *Id.*

²¹⁷ *Id.*

²¹⁸ See Friends of the Canadian War Museum, *Fact Sheet: The Japanese Fire Balloons*, http://www.friends-amis.org/fireballoons_e.html (last visited June 14, 2005); Greg Goebel, *The Fire Balloons*, <http://www.faqs.org/docs/air/avfusen.html> (last visited Feb. 17, 2005).

²¹⁹ See Linda Voss, *Balloons as Forerunners of Spaceflight and Exploration*, http://www.centennialofflight.gov/essay/Lighter_than_air/Balloons_and_Space/LTA17.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2005).

²²⁰ See *id.*

The U.S. Air Force also began a program of releasing unmanned high-altitude balloons in 1956.²²¹ The balloons were launched from various locations around the world to conduct atmospheric research.²²² However, at the same time, the U.S. Air Force was launching similar balloons over the U.S.S.R. in an attempt to gain intelligence.²²³ The intelligence gathering efforts were not very successful.²²⁴ The weather research cover story was blown in early 1956 when the U.S.S.R. recovered one of the balloons and developed the film it carried—the pictures showed Soviet territory.²²⁵ President Eisenhower terminated further launches by the U.S. Air Force of high-altitude balloons in mid-March of 1956.²²⁶

After 1956, research conducted by high-altitude balloons has continued.²²⁷ NASA is currently developing an ultra-long duration balloon (ULDB) that is being designed to achieve flights of up to 100 days.²²⁸ The ULDB reached an altitude of 115,000 feet (21.8 miles or 35.1 kilometers) during tests in Australia in 2001.²²⁹ During a subsequent test of the ULDB in June 2006, it reached an altitude of 25.7 miles (41.5 kilometers).²³⁰ The balloons are designed to lift a large telescope to an altitude of

²²¹ TERRILL, *supra* note 148, at 5. In one operation, "Project Genetrix," 516 balloons were launched from locations in Europe. The balloons carried automatic cameras and tracking beacons so that they could be recovered. *See id.* In operation "Moby Dick," the U.S. Air Force released "some two thousand balloons from various sites around the earth." *Id.*

²²² *Id.* at 14 n.25 (noting that although some balloons were used for intelligence gathering, some were actually only used for weather research).

²²³ *Id.* at 5–6.

²²⁴ *Id.* at 5.

²²⁵ *See* U.S.S.R. Note to the United States of Feb. 18, 1956, *reprinted in* 34 DEP'T ST. BULL. 427, 428 (1956). The U.S.S.R. also asserted that the captured balloons did not carry any instruments to measure basic meteorological elements. *See id.* *See also* *Russians Display Balloons of U.S.*, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1956, at 1. Coincidentally, while the U.S.S.R. was protesting U.S. balloon flights, one of the Soviet Union's meteorological balloons landed in Japan. *See* Waldemar Kaempffert, *Science in Review: Weather Balloons, to Which Russia Objects, Yield Data Useful to All Nations*, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1956, at E11.

²²⁶ TERRILL, *supra* note 148, at 6.

²²⁷ *See generally* Linda Voss, *Scientific Use of Balloons in the Second Half of the Twentieth Century* http://www.centennialofflight.gov/essay/Lighter_than_air/Science_Missions-20th-Part_II/LTA15.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2005).

²²⁸ *NASA to Launch Balloons from Sweden*, MSNBC.COM, Feb. 16, 2005, <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6981227/>.

²²⁹ Voss, *supra* note 227.

²³⁰ *Giant NASA Balloon Lifts Of [sic] from Esrange Space Center*, SPACEMART, June 5, 2006, http://www.spacemart.com/reports/Giant_NASA_Balloon_Lifts_Of_From_Esrange_Space_Center.html.

about 25 miles (40 kilometers).²³¹ The balloons will be launched from Sweden and travel to Alaska but will not cross Russia, which, demonstrating a claim of sovereignty reminiscent of cold-war politics, has not granted permission for the balloons to cross its territory.²³²

Another NASA balloon, carrying the cosmic ray energetics and mass (CREAM) experiment, traveled for forty-one days and twenty-two hours after its launch in Antarctica on December 16, 2004.²³³ The balloon lifted the two-ton CREAM experiment to a height of 125,000 feet (23.7 miles or 38.1 kilometers).²³⁴

After balloons, the United States used high-altitude aircraft to gather intelligence on other countries.²³⁵ Besides the well-known X-15, in the 1950s and the U.S. Air Force experimented with many other high altitude vehicles.²³⁶ Using the Lockheed U-2, the United States flew missions over the U.S.S.R. beginning in late 1956.²³⁷ These missions provided very useful intelligence but after the U-2 flown by Gary Powers was brought down over the U.S.S.R. on May 1, 1960, the United States stopped these missions as well.²³⁸

²³¹ See *NASA to Launch Balloons from Sweden*, *supra* note 228; *Spectacular Balloon Flights from Esrange to Alaska this Spring*, SPACE DAILY, Feb. 15, 2005.

²³² See *NASA to Launch Balloons from Sweden*, *supra* note 228.

²³³ See *NASA Balloon Makes Record-Breaking Flight*, SPACE DAILY, Jan. 31, 2005.

²³⁴ See *id.*

²³⁵ See *id.*

²³⁶ *Id.*

²³⁷ See TERRILL, *supra* note 148, at 6.

²³⁸ *Id.* at 73 n.7. Even a year after the crashed U-2, some senior leaders in the U.S. military did not think the United States had violated international law by flying the aircraft over U.S.S.R. territory. See *id.* at 66. According to Terrill, in 1961, U.S. Air Force Lieutenant General Richard M. Montgomery, the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force, stated that Colonel Martin Menter "didn't know what he was talking about" when Colonel Menter said the United States had violated international law when Francis Gary Powers flew over the U.S.S.R. in his U-2. See *id.* Colonel Menter was later promoted to Brigadier General and became a founding member of the International Institute of Space Law (IISL), serving as president of the U.S. Association of the IISL, and as the vice-president of the IISL for six years. Some contemporary writers also expressed the opinion that the United States had not violated the sovereignty of the U.S.S.R. One such writer, Spencer M. Beresford, expressed several reasons why the U-2 flight did not violate U.S.S.R. sovereignty: because the U.S.S.R. never ratified the Chicago Convention, other states were not bound to recognize U.S.S.R. air sovereignty (this argument ignores the fact that article 1 of the Chicago Convention recognizes all states have sovereignty over their air space, even the U.S.S.R. despite the fact that in 1960 it was not a party to the Chicago Convention); the U-2 flights could not violate U.S.S.R. air sovereignty because the term had not been defined (again, this argument ignores that even under the

As mentioned in the introduction, the U.S. Air Force has recently expressed renewed interest in operating vehicles for various missions at high altitudes. The U.S. Air Force thinks operating in this area will be less expensive than the cost of current unmanned aerial vehicles or satellites and can cover gaps in satellite coverage.²³⁹ The vehicles under development are lighter-than-air vehicles, glider-like vehicles, and hybrids (a blend of airship and traditional aircraft).²⁴⁰ One concept includes launching a surveillance glider from a high-altitude balloon.²⁴¹ One Air Force officer implied that the glider could be used to fly over other States.²⁴² However, a U.S. Air Force attorney recently said “we recogni[z]e fully that the existing laws and treaties will apply in near space. At the altitudes that we are talking about today for these specific technologies, it is air law that will apply.”²⁴³ Several different vehicles have already been tested and the operational altitude ultimately may reach 100,000

Paris Convention definition, the U-2 is an aircraft and it flies by generating lift over its wings); the U-2 is a state aircraft so U-2 flights are not regulated by the Chicago Convention (this argument again ignores the article 1 declaration that all states have sovereignty over their air space); finally, he argues that sovereignty should be based on effective control. See Beresford, *supra* note 194, at 109–13. Mr. Beresford was special counsel for the U.S. House of Representatives Select Committee on Astronautics and Space Exploration and drafted the Committee’s report, *Survey of Space Law*. See SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASTRONAUTICS AND SPACE EXPLORATION, SURVEY OF SPACE LAW, H.R. Doc. No. 86-89, at v (1959).

²³⁹ See William B. Scott, *Near-Space Frontier: Vehicles Roaming the Edge of Earth’s Atmosphere Offer Military Potential*, AV. WK. & SPACE TECH., Feb. 14, 2005, at 71 [hereinafter Scott, *Near-Space Frontier*]; *Air Force May Spread Wings in Near Space*, CNN.COM, Jan. 19, 2005, available at www.spacedata.net/news011905.htm.

²⁴⁰ See Scott, *Near-Space Frontier*, *supra* note 239, at 71; *Air Force May Spread Wings in Near Space*, *supra* note 239; Andrea Shalal-Esa, *Air Force War Game Aims to Test Space Technologies*, YORKSHIRE CND, Feb. 5, 2005; Jefferson Morris, *Near-Space Free-Floating Balloons a Candidate for Quick Deployment*, AEROSPACE DAILY & DEFENSE REP., Nov. 8, 2004, http://cndyorks.gn.apc.org/yspace/articles/space_war_game.htm.

²⁴¹ Morris, *supra* note 240, at 3.

²⁴² See *id.* The article quotes a U.S. Air Force officer as saying:

The balloon floats “over to your area of interest, and then once they’ve gotten [there], they release the glider and the glider goes in a lazy circle The beauty of it is, you can recover the glider in friendly territory, so if you have a high-value payload, you don’t lose it, like you do with these other free-floater concepts.”

Id. (emphasis added).

²⁴³ Michael Sirak, *US Air Force Sees Promise in ‘Near Space’*, JANE’S DEF. WKLY., Oct. 13, 2004, available at <http://www.spacedata.net/news101304.htm> (quoting Major Elizabeth Waldrop, Chief of Space and International Law for U.S. Air Force Space Command).

feet (19 miles or 30.5 kilometers),²⁴⁴ well above the current limit for conventional flight. In one test, the U.S. Air Force used a balloon to carry a standard U.S. Army radio to an altitude of 65,000 feet (12.3 miles or 19.8 km), increasing the radio's range by almost 250 nm (288 miles or 463 kilometers).²⁴⁵ At one point, the U.S. Air Force considered operating some of the vehicles by the end of 2006.²⁴⁶

Other states are also working on high-altitude vehicles.²⁴⁷ The U.K. Ministry of Defence is testing a high altitude aircraft called the Zephyr 3.²⁴⁸ It is expected to fly to 132,000 feet (25 miles or 40.2 kilometers), higher than any other unmanned aircraft.²⁴⁹

Some civilian businesses are also considering the use of high altitude vehicles.²⁵⁰ One potential use for them is as communications relay stations.²⁵¹ High-altitude communication networks based on lighter-than-air vehicles or aircraft operating in relatively fixed locations at approximately 65,000 feet (12 miles or 20 kilometers) or higher are known as high altitude platform stations (HAPS).²⁵² At this altitude, the HAPS are above the jet stream so winds are relatively calm, and it is easier to keep the platform in a stable location horizontally.²⁵³ HAPS offer several advantages over satellite networks.²⁵⁴ They are potentially less expensive to field; they operate much lower than geostationary communications satellites, so there is no transmission delay; and they can be brought back down to earth for repair or equipment upgrades.²⁵⁵

To take advantage of the communications potential of these vehicles, HAPS must have access to the radio spectrum without

²⁴⁴ See Scott, *Near-Space Frontier*, *supra* note 239, at 71.

²⁴⁵ See Jefferson Morris, *Lord Briefs Jumper on Near-Space; Deployment Could Be Upcoming*, AEROSPACE DAILY & DEFENSE REP., May 25, 2005.

²⁴⁶ See Shalal-Esa, *supra* note 240.

²⁴⁷ See Peter Almond, *British Solar Spy Plane Rises to a Record Challenge*, SUNDAY TIMES (London), Feb. 27, 2005.

²⁴⁸ *Id.*

²⁴⁹ *Id.*

²⁵⁰ See Sanswire Networks, What is a Stratellite?, <http://www.sanswire.com/stratellite.htm> (last visited May 6, 2007).

²⁵¹ *Id.*

²⁵² *Id.*

²⁵³ See *id.*

²⁵⁴ See Mike Mills, *Haig Floats a High-Tech Trial Balloon*, WASH. POST, Apr. 13, 1998, at F5.

²⁵⁵ See *id.*

interference.²⁵⁶ The International Telecommunications Union (ITU), a United Nations affiliated international organization that coordinates radio spectrum use to ensure radio frequency users do not interfere with each other, has a long history of allocating frequencies for use by vehicles in the atmosphere.²⁵⁷ The need for coordination was demonstrated by the orbiting of the first man-made satellite: Sputnik reportedly caused radio interference in at least three states.²⁵⁸ The frequency used by Sputnik had been assigned to a station in the Netherlands.²⁵⁹ The first ITU regulations relating to space telecommunications became effective on May 1, 1961.²⁶⁰ In the 1990s, the ITU began allocating frequencies for high-altitude platforms.²⁶¹ In 1997, the ITU allocated the 47 and 48 gigahertz (GHz) bands for use by HAPS.²⁶² In May 1997, the U.S. Federal Communications Commission allocated the 47 gigahertz band for HAPS.²⁶³ In 2000, the ITU allocated the 31/28 GHz and 2 GHz bands for use by HAPS.²⁶⁴

Several concepts for HAPS-based communications networks have been proposed.²⁶⁵ In the late 1990s, Sky Station planned to launch up to 250 balloons that would hover at an altitude of approximately 65,600 feet (12.4 miles or 20 kilometers) to transmit internet, video, and phone calls.²⁶⁶ One HAPS concept currently being designed and nearing testing is the airship platform called Stratellite, which is being developed by GlobeTel Communications Corporation.²⁶⁷ The Stratellite is a rigid airship.²⁶⁸

²⁵⁶ See *id.*

²⁵⁷ More specifically, "the ITU through its periodic conferences effects allocation of the radio frequency spectrum and registration of radio frequency assignments, coordinates efforts to eliminate harmful interference between radio stations of different countries, and establishes general standards for equipment and broadcasting techniques." See McDUGAL ET AL., *supra* note 20, at 633.

²⁵⁸ See Nandasiri Jasentuliyana, *Regulatory Functions of I.T.U. in the Field of Space Telecommunications*, 34 J. AIR L. & COM. 62, 65 (1968).

²⁵⁹ See *id.*

²⁶⁰ See McDUGAL ET AL., *supra* note 20, at 634.

²⁶¹ See Masayuki Oodo & Ryu Miura, *A Study of Frequency Sharing and Contribution to ITU for Wireless Communication Systems Using Stratospheric Platforms*, J. COMM. RES. LAB., Dec. 2001, at 39, available at <http://www.nict.go.jp/publication/shuppan/lcihou-journal/journal-vol48no4/toku3-2-1.pdf>.

²⁶² *Id.*

²⁶³ See Use of Radio Frequencies Above 40 GHz for New Radio Applications, 62 Fed. Reg. 43,116 (Aug. 12, 1997).

²⁶⁴ Oodo & Miura, *supra* note 261, at 39–40.

²⁶⁵ See, e.g., Mills, *supra* note 254, at F5.

²⁶⁶ *Id.*

²⁶⁷ See Sanswire Networks, *supra* note 250.

It is being designed to stay aloft for long periods of time, up to eighteen months.²⁶⁹ Other concepts are discussed by Ryszard Struzak in his paper *Mobile Telecommunications Via the Stratosphere*.²⁷⁰

B. FREEDOM OF ACCESS TO SPACE

Mr. Johnson, after initially opposing delineation, quickly changed his mind and became an advocate of delineation.²⁷¹ In 1959, he was cited asking for delineation as soon as possible and suggesting the altitude of 25 miles (40.2 kilometers) as a limit for vertical sovereignty.²⁷² He pointed out the problems states would have accessing space if vertical sovereignty was set too high. In 1961, he said:

Regardless of the status of outer space, spacecraft must first move through the territorial airspace to get there, and must move back through the territorial airspace if they are to return to earth. . . .

. . . .

Now, the United States is fortunately situated geographically so that the flight profile of Project Mercury presents no real problem. . . . Inevitably, it will become necessary to know in advance whether the launch phase or the re-entry phase violates the territorial airspace of another state. . . .

I do not suggest that agreement on the upward limit of territorial space will assist in distinguishing between what space activities should be permitted and what should be prohibited in non-territorial space. This is not the point. The point, rather, is that it seems desirable that there be a clearly-defined limit to the power of an individual state to declare unilaterally that certain activities are impermissible in the space above it and, by so doing, to engender an international legal dispute.²⁷³

In 1962, Mr. Johnson said

"[t]he area within which the underlying State possesses the right to 'veto' the activity of another State must not be permitted to extend to altitudes which would hamper the freedom of space exploration. It is of little value to speak of the freedom of outer

²⁶⁸ See *id.*

²⁶⁹ See *id.*

²⁷⁰ See Ryszard Struzak, *Mobile Telecommunications Via the Stratosphere*, <http://www.intercomms.net/AUG03/content/struzak1.php> (last visited June 9, 2005).

²⁷¹ See Monroe W. Karmin, *Up in the Air*, WALL ST. J., Nov. 25, 1959, at 1.

²⁷² *Id.*

²⁷³ Johnson, PROCEEDINGS, *supra* note 2, at 168–69.

space if man cannot travel freely to that realm and freely back to earth."²⁷⁴

Finally, in 1964 Mr. Johnson said:

It might be argued that the freedom of outer space "for exploration and use by all States in conformity with international law," as affirmed by the General Assembly resolution, necessarily implies freedom of access to outer space and, in the case of manned space exploration, freedom of return from outer space, and that there should therefore be no legal basis for protesting, merely on grounds of unpermitted presence, the overflight of national territory by ascending and descending spacecraft, regardless of altitude. In other words, no individual State, by assertion of exclusive control, would have the right to preclude access by another State to outer space or return to earth from outer space even at altitudes universally regarded as being within the territorial air space. It seems most doubtful, however, that such an unqualified principle will ever gain general acceptance. Exclusive control of the air space is so well-established that it is not likely, in the absence of effective pre-launch inspection disclosing the nature and capabilities of the craft involved, that an unlimited right of passage will be accorded craft at altitudes where aircraft may operate only with the prior permission of the underlying State. But if the exclusive control of the territorial sovereign may be invoked at altitudes of 10, 15, and 20 miles to exclude spacecraft not having prior permission, then at what altitude may one invoke a right of free access to outer space and free return from outer space so as not to require prior consent for the overflight of national territory?²⁷⁵

In the words of Professor Cooper,

Unless [the upper boundary of national airspace] is fairly close to the earth's surface, few States will be able to put a satellite into orbit . . . without passing through the national airspace of other States. In other words, few States will be free of a political veto by other States in planning orbital flights.²⁷⁶

²⁷⁴ Carl Q. Christol, "Innocent Passage" in the *International Law of Outer Space*, 7 A.F. L. REV. 22 (1965), reprinted in CARL Q. CHRISTOL, *SPACE LAW: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE* 329, 331 (1991) (quoting a statement of Mr. Johnson in a NASA News Release).

²⁷⁵ Johnson, *Freedom and Control*, *supra* note 7, at 141.

²⁷⁶ John Cobb Cooper, *Legal Problems of Spacecraft in Airspace*, reprinted in COOPER, *EXPLORATIONS IN AEROSPACE LAW*, *supra* note 25, at 305, 311. In 1965, Professor Cooper said:

If the complete preventive jurisdiction of a State above its lands and waters extends upward even fifty miles, future intercontinental and orbital outer space flight will be seriously handicapped. Until

This is because spacecraft are not launched straight up:

[T]he creation of absolute sovereignty up to [60 miles or 90 kilometers] places unnecessary constraint on trajectories of space mission launchings or landings. Before achieving a desired orbit the launch vehicle must pass at a slanting trajectory over substantial segments of the earth. The amount of energy required for a 'vertical' launch in order to protect 'boundaries' would be exorbitant and practically insupportable.²⁷⁷

The 1998 launch by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) of a long-range rocket highlighted the access to space issue. On August 31, 1998, North Korea launched a rocket from its Hawdaegun MISSILE Test Facility that flew "over" Japan.²⁷⁸ North Korea gave no advance notice or warnings of the launch.²⁷⁹ There is some disagreement over whether this was a two-stage or three-stage rocket.²⁸⁰ It may have been a Taepo Dong I ballistic missile.²⁸¹ North Korea asserted that the launch successfully orbited a satellite, a claim supported by Rus-

the time arrives when flight instrumentalities are available with almost vertical take-off into and subsequent descent from outer space it will continue [to be] necessary to plan outer space flight with gradual ascent and even more gradual descent. Few States are geographically located so that they can, without difficulty, plan outer-space flight without assuming descent from outer space at altitudes less than fifty miles above the surface territories of other States.

Cooper, *Contiguous Zones*, *supra* note 152, at 325. However, as mentioned above, space tourist vehicles modeled after SpaceShipOne may operate within a very narrow horizontal space, so transiting over another state's territory may not be an issue for them. See generally *supra* text accompanying note 171.

²⁷⁷ S. Mishra & T. Pavlasek, *On the Lack of Physical Bases for Defining a Boundary Between Air Space and Outer Space*, VII ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 399, 403 (1982).

²⁷⁸ See Joseph C. Anselmo et al., *Missile Test Extends North Korea's Reach*, AV. WK. & SPACE TECH., Sept. 7, 1998, at 56; Paul Mann, *Missile Defense Boosted, Despite Weak Management*, AV. WK. & SPACE TECH., Oct. 26, 1998, at 34. The launch site is also called "Nodong" and is located at 40 degrees, 51 minutes, and 17 seconds North Latitude, 129 degrees, 39 minutes, and 58 seconds East Longitude. See Federation of American Scientist, No-dong, <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/facility/nodong.htm> (last visited Mar. 23, 2005) [hereinafter Federation of American Scientist, No-dong].

²⁷⁹ See Kazuhiro Nakatani, *The Taepodong Missile Incident and Emerging Issues of Interpretation and Application of Space Treaties*, in INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF SPACE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASTRONAUTICAL FEDERATION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-FOURTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 144, 144 (2002).

²⁸⁰ Compare Graham Warwick, *Phantom Satellite*, FLIGHT INT'L, Oct. 7, 1998, at 37 (claiming that the rocket had three-stages), with Anselmo et al., *supra* note 278, at 256 (claiming that the rocket had two-stages).

²⁸¹ See Nakatani, *supra* note 279, at 144; Warwick, *supra* note 280, at 37; Federation of American Scientist, No-dong, *supra* note 278.

sia.²⁸² The first stage landed in the sea 157 miles (253 kilometers) downrange.²⁸³ Apparently, the second stage (or possibly the heat shield) flew "over" Japan and landed in the Pacific Ocean 1023 miles (1646 kilometers downrange from its launch point and approximately 348 miles (560 kilometers) from Japan.²⁸⁴ This area is near international airway A590 where at the time 180 aircraft flew every day.²⁸⁵ I have been unable to find any information on the height of the rocket during its ascent and while passing over Japanese territory. On July 5, 2006, North Korea attempted another Taepo Dong 2 launch.²⁸⁶ However, this launch failed so quickly that it is unclear whether the launch was meant to orbit a satellite or test a ballistic missile.²⁸⁷

North Korea is not a party to the Outer Space Treaty, but the Treaty recognizes that outer space is free for "all States."²⁸⁸ Although North Korea may not be an ideologically good example of a state with access to space, geographically it is a good example because, although it is a coastal state and the launch took place from its coast, it still had geographic problems accessing space.²⁸⁹ As recently as 1999, Elizabeth Kelly said

[t]o date, as far as is known, space objects have not had to traverse the airspace of foreign states en route to outer space. Currently, objects are launched vertically, either from launch sites in states with large territories or from launch sites on or near the high seas, substantially decreasing the possibility that a foreign State's national airspace will be crossed.²⁹⁰

²⁸² See *North Korea Claims Taepo Dong I Orbiting a Satellite*, AEROSPACE DAILY, Sept. 8, 1998, at 377.

²⁸³ See Warwick, *supra* note 280, at 37. It landed at 40 degrees, 54 minutes North Latitude, 134 degrees, 3 minutes East Longitude. See Anselmo et al., *supra* note 278.

²⁸⁴ See Warwick, *supra* note 280, at 37. It landed at 40 degrees, 11 minutes North Latitude, 147 degrees, 50 minutes East Longitude. See Anselmo et al., *supra* note 278, at 256. North Korea reported slightly different coordinates for the impact locations of the two stages. See Phillip Clark, *North Korea's First Satellite: Fact and Fiction*, 15 SPACE POL'Y 141, 141 (1999).

²⁸⁵ See *Safety of Navigation*, ICAO Ass. Res. A32-6 (Oct. 2, 1998), available at http://www.icao.int/icao/en/res/a32_6.htm.

²⁸⁶ William B. Scott et al., *Threat or Dud?; Frustrated International Community Wrestles with NORTH KOREA'S In-Your-Face "Tests"*, AV. WK. & SPACE TECH., July 10, 2006, at 24.

²⁸⁷ See *id.*

²⁸⁸ See Outer Space Treaty, *supra* note 6, art. I.

²⁸⁹ Kelly, *supra* note 166, at 37.

²⁹⁰ *Id.*

Of course, North Korea's launch over Japan highlights the security concerns of other states.²⁹¹ The Republic of Korea (South Korea) called the launch an "invasion of Japanese Air Space."²⁹² This may have been a short-sighted statement on its part because South Korea is now in a similar position.²⁹³ In 2003, South Korea broke ground on its own space center.²⁹⁴ The center is being built near the town of Kohung on Oenaro Island off South Korea's southern coast and was planned to be completed in 2005.²⁹⁵ Japan is concerned about the trajectory of the launches from the South Korean launch site because the launches will go near (or over) some Japanese islands.²⁹⁶ Based on its location, the South Korean launch site would have only limited launch azimuths available without launching over Japanese territory.²⁹⁷ If South Korea cannot launch toward the east, its launch vehicles will not be able to take advantage of the velocity of the Earth's rotation.²⁹⁸ Therefore, to launch a satellite into orbit, South Korea's launch vehicles will have to be more powerful (and therefore more costly) than vehicles launching the same satellite from other locations that can launch east.²⁹⁹

²⁹¹ See *Analysis – E. Asia Anxious About Japan Response To N Korea*, ASIA PULSE, Sept. 4, 1998.

²⁹² *Id.*

²⁹³ See *Ground Broken Today for Korea's First Space Center*, KOREA HERALD, Aug. 8, 2003.

²⁹⁴ *Id.*

²⁹⁵ *Id.*

²⁹⁶ Interview with Professor Ram Jakhu, Associate Professor, McGill University, in Montreal, Can. (May 10, 2005).

²⁹⁷ See WRIGHT ET AL., *supra* note 4, at 80.

The rotation of the Earth gives a rocket an eastward velocity even before it is launched. If the rocket is launched to the east, it can use this velocity to increase its speed. Since the speed of the Earth's surface is greatest at the equator (0.456 km/s), launching from a location at low latitudes (near the equator) increases the rocket's speed and therefore increases its launch capability. . . .

Similarly, if the rocket is not able to launch eastward, it cannot take full advantage of the speed of the Earth's rotation, and this reduces its launch capability. This can happen, for example, if the satellite is being launched into a polar orbit, in which case the rocket is launched toward the north or south. Or the launch directions may be restricted so that the rocket does not fly over populated areas early in flight.

Id. (footnote omitted).

²⁹⁸ *Id.*

²⁹⁹ For example, a Lockheed Martin Titan IVB could place 47,800 lbs (21,680 kg) into low Earth orbit (LEO), but only 38,800 lbs (17,600 kg) into a LEO polar

North Korea's launch site means it has even more limitations on its launch azimuths unless it continues to launch its rockets "over" its neighbors.

Putting aside sovereignty issues, a more practical problem may be safety downrange from the launch site. One former U.S. expendable heavy launch vehicle, the Titan IVB, *had two solid propellant rocket motors and a two-stage liquid propellant rocket core.*³⁰⁰ The first stage of the liquid core weighed approximately 17,600 pounds (8,000 kilograms) empty, and the second stage weighed approximately 9,900 pounds (4,500 kilograms) empty.³⁰¹ *Each solid rocket motor weighed approximately 95,000 pounds (43,100 kilograms) empty.*³⁰² All vehicle stages of these expendable launch vehicles that do not reach orbit fall back to the surface of the earth during the launch process.³⁰³ Launch trajectories are programmed so that the expended stages impact in the open ocean "far from coastal areas."³⁰⁴

Besides the danger posed by the falling spent boosters causing damage by impact alone, the spent boosters may still contain toxic chemicals.³⁰⁵ For example, the SS-18 intercontinental ballistic missile, which the Russian Federation is marketing as a commercial space launch vehicle, has an expendable first stage that contains up to a ton of unburned toxic fuel when it hits the ground.³⁰⁶ One version of the SS-18 is fueled by 376,000 pounds (171,000 kilograms) of nitrogen tetroxide (N₂O₄) and an unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine compound.³⁰⁷ The Titan IV liq-

orbit. See OFFICE OF COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, *supra* note 180, at 9. Objects are placed into a polar orbit by launching them toward the north or south. See WRIGHT ET AL., *supra* note 4, at 80. A polar orbit means the object in orbit will pass over the Earth's poles. See *id.* at 23.

³⁰⁰ See U.S. AIR FORCE, TITAN IV FACT SHEET (1995), available at http://www.losangeles.af.mil/SMC/PA/Fact_Sheets/ttn4_fs.htm.

³⁰¹ See Andrews Space & Technology, Titan IVB Specifications, http://www.spaceandtech.com/spacedata/elvs/titan4b_specs.shtml (last visited May 11, 2005).

³⁰² See GlobalSecurity.org, Titan IV Solid Rocket Motor (SRM), <http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/t4-config-5.htm> (last visited May 11, 2005).

³⁰³ See U.S. AIR FORCE, SPACE DIVISION, Supplement to the Environmental Assessment, Titan IV Program 2-27 (1988) [hereinafter TITAN IV SUPPLEMENT EA] (on file with author); Dene Moore, *Oil Rigs Fear Hit from U.S. Space Junk*, VANCOUVER SUN, Apr. 7, 2005, at A10 [hereinafter Moore, Space Junk].

³⁰⁴ TITAN IV SUPPLEMENT EA, *supra* note 303, at 2-27.

³⁰⁵ See James Oberg, *Russians Harness Cold War Demons for Space*, MSNBC.COM, Dec. 17, 2004, <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6729146/>.

³⁰⁶ See *id.*

³⁰⁷ See Federation of American Scientist, R-36M / SS-18 SATAN, <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/icbm/r-36m.htm> (last visited May 11, 2005).

uid core stages are both fueled by Aerozine-50 (a mixture of hydrazine and unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine (UDMH)) and nitrogen tetroxide (N_2O_4).³⁰⁸ The first stage carries 342,000 pounds (155,000 kilograms) of propellant and the second stage carries 77,000 pounds (35,000 kilograms) of propellant.³⁰⁹ Some of the propellant is expected to be present in the spent, suborbital stages that are programmed to fall into the ocean.³¹⁰ For the Titan III, the U.S. Air Force found that the remaining solid and liquid fuel in the spent stages that fall into the ocean would result in insignificant water pollution except "for worst case situations involving highly unlikely combinations of events."³¹¹ However, these propellants are highly toxic; in August of 2003, a leak of only forty gallons (152 liters) of N_2O_4 during the fueling of a Titan IVB caused the evacuation of the entire launch complex.³¹²

The Russian Federation recently obtained permission from Turkmenistan for spent rocket stages from SS-18 intercontinental ballistic missiles converted to civilian use and launched in southern Russia (near Orenburg) to land in Turkmenistan.³¹³ However, for Russia's main launch site, Baikonur in Kazakhstan, the permissible launch azimuths are limited to prevent spent rocket stages from impacting in populated areas or within foreign states.³¹⁴ For example, launches due east are not possible from Baikonur because "lower rocket stages would fall on Chinese territory."³¹⁵ "For those launch corridors which are used,

³⁰⁸ See GlobalSecurity.org, Titan IV Liquid Rocket Engine (LRE), <http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/t4-config-4.htm> (last visited May 11, 2005).

³⁰⁹ See Titan IVB Specifications, *supra* note 301.

³¹⁰ See TITAN IV SUPPLEMENT EA, *supra* note 303, at 2-27; U.S. AIR FORCE, Final Environmental Statement: United States Air Force Space Launch Vehicles 71 (1975) [hereinafter AIR FORCE SPACE LAUNCH VEHICLES EA], available at <http://ax.losangeles.af.mil/axf/eaapgs/docs/esslv275.pdf>.

³¹¹ AIR FORCE SPACE LAUNCH VEHICLES EA, *supra* note 310, at 71-80. For the Titan IV, the Air Force found that "relatively small amounts of propellant may also be released into the ocean" in the spent stages and that "because of the small amount of residual propellants present and the large volume of water available for dilution, no significant impacts are expected to be caused by the reentry of spent stages." TITAN IV SUPPLEMENT EA, *supra* note 303, at 2-27.

³¹² See U.S. Air Force Print News Today, *Rocket-Propellant Leak Cleaned*, Aug. 14, 2003, http://www.af.mil/news/story_print.asp?storyID=123005425 (last visited Nov. 24, 2006).

³¹³ See Oberg, *supra* note 305.

³¹⁴ See Federation of American Scientist, Baikonur Cosmodrome <http://www.fas.org/spp/guide/russia/facility/baikonur.htm> (last visited May 11, 2005).

³¹⁵ *Id.*

tens o thousands [sic] of tons of spent boosters, many with toxic residual propellants still on board, now litter the countryside.”³¹⁶

Although ground safety may not be as much of a problem for some of the vehicles discussed previously that do not drop expended components (such as single-stage to orbit vehicles or reusable launch vehicles), it will continue to be a problem for more conventional vehicles.³¹⁷ In January of 1995, six people were killed and twenty-three injured on the ground in China after the failure of a Chinese Long March rocket.³¹⁸ In February of 1996, another Long March rocket failed seconds after launch and at least six more died and fifty-seven were injured.³¹⁹

In the North Korea example, Japan could rightly express concern due to spent boosters falling near its territory. It is possible that the rocket component that came down near Japan would have descended below 62 miles (100 kilometers) while above the territory of Japan. Obviously,

[s]erious problems might arise from the possible impact of spent rocket parts on foreign territory, if a State whose territory does not include any suitable location satisfying the safety regulations normally imposed on launching sites should nevertheless wish to construct its own facility and to launch its own satellites. In this case, the co-operation of any State potentially affected by such an enterprise has to be ensured, since safety measures will have to be taken by this State, e.g., evacuation of certain areas, or arrangements to clear the flight path below the space object from international aviation.³²⁰

Professor Kazuhiro Nakatani argued that the launch by North Korea violated provisions of several international conventions.³²¹ However, Professor Nakatani did not reach a conclusion on whether or not the rocket’s flight violated Japan’s territorial sovereignty because “there is no clear-cut delimitation between airspace and outer space.”³²² Because North Korea provided no prior warning of the launch, Professor Nakatani wrote that the launch violated annex 11 of the Chicago Convention and Inter-

³¹⁶ *Id.*

³¹⁷ See Marcia S. Smith, *Space Launch Vehicles: Government Activities, Commercial Competition, and Satellite Exports*, Cong. Res. Serv. Pub. No. I893062, at 12 (2003), available at <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/17353.pdf>.

³¹⁸ *Id.*

³¹⁹ See *id.*

³²⁰ *Id.* at 16.

³²¹ See Nakatani, *supra* note 279, at 150.

³²² *Id.*

national Maritime Organization (IMO) Assembly Resolution 706.³²³ As Professor Nakatani pointed out,³²⁴ annex 11 of the Chicago Convention was violated because North Korea failed to provide prior warning of the launch to air traffic service authorities as required by standard 2.17.1.³²⁵ The ICAO Assembly also considered the launch without notice a violation of the Standards and Recommended Practices of the Chicago Convention.³²⁶ North Korea deposited its notice of adherence to the Chicago Convention on August 16, 1977.³²⁷

The launch violated IMO Assembly Resolution 706 because member states are required to provide navigational warnings for various reasons, including "missile firings, [or] space missions" which might affect the safety of shipping, not less than five days before the event.³²⁸ The IMO's Maritime Safety Committee reviewed the August 1998 launch by North Korea because the rocket parts fell into major maritime trade routes and fishing grounds and "had the potential of posing a serious threat to the safety of navigation."³²⁹ The Committee invited member states to strictly comply with recommendations contained in IMO Assembly Resolution A.706(17).³³⁰ North Korea joined the IMO in 1986.³³¹

³²³ *Id.* at 144.

³²⁴ *Id.* at 145.

³²⁵ SEE AIR TRAFFIC SERVICES, ANNEX 11 TO THE CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION (13th ed. 2001). Standard 2.17.1 provides:

The arrangements for activities potentially hazardous to civil aircraft, whether over the territory of a State or over the high seas, shall be coordinated with the appropriate air traffic services authorities. The coordination shall be effected early enough to permit timely promulgation of information regarding the activities in accordance with the provisions of Annex 15.

Id.

³²⁶ See *Safety of Navigation*, *supra* note 285.

³²⁷ See *Status of Chicago Convention*, *supra* note 67.

³²⁸ See *World-Wide Navigational Warning Service*, Annex 1 para. 4.2.1.3.12, IMO Assembly Res. A.706(17), reprinted in International Maritime Organization, *Adoption of the Revised NAVTEX Manual*, MSC/Circ. 1122, Annex 4 (May 24, 2004), available at http://www.imo.org/includes/blastData.asp/doc_id=3770/1122.pdf.

³²⁹ International Maritime Organization, *Navigational Warning Concerning Operations Endangering the Safety of Navigation*, MSC/Circ. 893, at 1 (Dec. 21, 1998), available at http://www.imo.org/includes/blastData.asp/doc_id=821/893.

³³⁰ *Id.*

³³¹ See International Maritime Organization, IMO Member States with Year of Joining http://www.imo.org/About/mainframe.asp?topic_id=315&doc_id=840 (last visited May 2, 2005).

The United States is not immune from having its freedom of access to space questioned. First, "launches made from current [intercontinental ballistic missile] silos drop expended booster stages on the United States and Canada."³³² The Liability Convention imposes absolute liability on the launching state for damage caused on the surface of the Earth or to aircraft in flight by the state's "space object" or the "launch vehicle and parts thereof."³³³ However, it is not clear if the Liability Convention would cover damage caused by spent ICBM boosters because the Convention does not specify when an object becomes a "space object" and ballistic missiles do not go into orbit.³³⁴ Professor Cheng concludes, however, that any object, including an ICBM, launched to an altitude above 81 miles (130 km) is a space object,³³⁵ so the Liability Convention applies.³³⁶ The same conclusion was earlier reached by the U.S. Department of State.³³⁷ While the U.S. Senate was conducting hearings on the Liability Convention, the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations wrote a letter to Senator J.W. Fulbright, the Chairman of the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and said,

[i]t would therefore appear that any unintentional damage caused by an ICBM would be covered by the Liability Convention just as it is already covered by article VII of the Outer Space Treaty. We believe the general tendency in case of doubt would

³³² See SPACY, *supra* note 175, at 77.

³³³ Liability Convention, *supra* note 15, Arts. I, II.

³³⁴ *Id.*

³³⁵ Bin Cheng, *Definitional Issues in Space Law: 'Space Objects', 'Astronauts', and Related Expressions*, 34 SPACE L. COLLOQUIUM 17 (1991), *reprinted in* CHENG, SPACE LAW, *supra* note 211, at 492, 498.

³³⁶ See Bin Cheng, *International Responsibility and Liability for Launch Activities*, 20 AIR & SPACE L. 297 (1995), *reprinted in* CHENG, SPACE LAW, *supra* note 182, at 599, 602.

³³⁷ Letter from David M. Abshire, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, to Senator J.W. Fulbright, Chairman, U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (Sept. 6, 1972), *in* SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE CAUSED BY SPACE OBJECTS, S. EXEC. REP. NO. 92-38, app. at 8, para. 3 (1972). Assistant Secretary Abshire continued,

Furthermore, damage caused by the intentional launching of a missile against a foreign target would be a hostile act and under most circumstances an act of war. As a general rule of international law, subject to exceptions that need not concern us here, a multilateral treaty such as the Liability Convention does not apply to conditions of war or hostilities.

Id. para. 4.

be to say that an object is a 'space object' within the meaning of the Convention.³³⁸

I have been unable to find any agreement between the United States and Canada discussing this issue or granting the United States authority to have spent ICBM boosters fall into Canadian territory. However, the United States signed an agreement with the United Kingdom in 1950 establishing a missile test range covering portions of the Bahama Islands.³³⁹ This agreement covers the area generally downrange from the launch area of the Kennedy Space Center in Florida,³⁴⁰ and it was amended several times.³⁴¹

The access to space issue is broader than merely cases where launch trajectories pass over foreign territory or booster debris falls in foreign territory. As oceans become more and more economically important and exploited, the issue will continue to grow.

In April of 2005, Canada expressed concern that a spent booster from a Titan IV planned to be launched from Patrick Air Force Base in Florida would fall near a deep sea oil platform near Newfoundland.³⁴² The spent booster was expected to weigh 22,000 pounds (10,000 kilograms) after the fuel was expended and was projected to fall within 15.5 miles (25 kilometers) of the Hibernia oil platform.³⁴³ The Hibernia platform is about 196 miles (315 kilometers) southeast of Saint John's, Newfoundland,³⁴⁴ well outside of Canada's territorial waters. The

³³⁸ *Id.*

³³⁹ See Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Concerning a Long Range Proving Ground for Guided Missiles to be Known as "The Bahamas Long Range Proving Ground," July 21, 1950, U.S.-U.K., 1 U.S.T. 545.

³⁴⁰ As noted above, the agreement created the Bahamas Long Range Proving Ground and was in the vicinity of Cape Canaveral, Florida. See *id.* pmbl.

³⁴¹ See generally, e.g., Agreement for a Tracking Station on Grand Bahama, U.S.-U.K., May 3, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 4832; Agreement Regarding Bahamas Long Range Proving Ground: Extension of Flight Testing Range, U.S.-U.K., Apr. 1, 1957, 8 U.S.T. 493.

³⁴² See Moore, Space Junk, *supra* note 303.

³⁴³ See *id.*

³⁴⁴ See *No Rocket Risk Acceptable, Williams Says*, HALIFAX DAILY NEWS (Nova Scotia), April 11, 2005, at 7; Foothills Search and Rescue, Hibernia Off-Shore Oil Platform, <http://www.foothills-sar.ab.ca/photos/Hibernia.html>. Depending on the exact location of the platform, it might even fall outside of Canada's exclusive economic zone (EEZ), which is 200 nm wide. See Law of the Sea Convention, *supra* note 98, art. 57. One article puts the platform at "350 kilometers east of St.

booster's projected impact site is approximately 2,300 miles (3,700 kilometers) downrange from the Titan IV's launch site. A U.S. Air Force spokesperson said for all launches, the U.S. Air Force Space Command devises an impact "box" and there is only a one in one trillion chance of impact outside of the planned box.³⁴⁵ The Hibernia platform was 1 mile (1.6 kilometers) outside the box projected for the spent booster.³⁴⁶ However, the Newfoundland government and the offshore oil industry initially planned to evacuate the drilling platform.³⁴⁷ Evacuating the platform would have included removing all oil from the platform, capping all wells, and flushing lines—this could have taken the platform out of production for up to two weeks and would have meant a loss of \$250 million.³⁴⁸ Although evacuating the platform might be prudent to avoid potential (but apparently unlikely) loss of life, the cost of evacuation and loss of profit would not be compensable under the Liability Convention.³⁴⁹ Ironically, if the booster hit the platform and killed someone, the loss of life and property damage would be compensable. Newfoundland's Premier, Danny Williams, said the United States should offer compensation if "a shutdown is necessary."³⁵⁰ Canada's Defence Minister, Bill Graham, said "We strongly urge the United States government not to follow this trajectory but to choose a trajectory which will take their rocket further away from these very important installations."³⁵¹ However, a U.S. Air Force spokesperson said that changing the trajectory would mean more risk for mainland Canada and the United States.³⁵² The U.S. Air Force decided not to change the

John's," or approximately 189 nm (217 miles). See *Missile Test Delayed After Sparking Scare at Oil Platforms*, CBS NEWS, Apr. 7, 2005. <http://www.cbc.ca/story/canada/national/2005/04/07/nfld-oil-050407.html>.

³⁴⁵ See Moore, *Space Junk*, *supra* note 303.

³⁴⁶ See *id.*

³⁴⁷ See *id.*

³⁴⁸ See *id.*

³⁴⁹ See Liability Convention, *supra* note 15, Arts. I, II.

The term "damage" means loss of life, personal injury or other impairment of health; or loss of or damage to property of States or of persons, natural or juridical, or property of international intergovernmental organizations.

Id. art. I(a).

³⁵⁰ Moore, *Space Junk*, *supra* note 303.

³⁵¹ Dene Moore, *U.S. Delays Atlantic Rocket Launch*, LONDON FREE PRESS (Ontario), Apr. 8, 2005, at A3.

³⁵² See Dene Moore, *Rocket Risk to Nfld. Offshore Not New, Not Likely a Problem*: *Space Analyst*, CANADIAN PRESS, Apr. 12, 2005 [hereinafter Moore, *Rocket Risk*].

trajectory, and Premier Williams said he had been assured that the rocket would be destroyed if it veered off course and threatened the oil platforms.³⁵³ The satellite was launched on April 29, 2005, and the spent booster caused no damage.³⁵⁴

One space analyst thought the plan to evacuate the oil platform was unusual because similar rockets had been launched along the same trajectory for years without incident.³⁵⁵ However, the issue will probably arise again as the area becomes more congested. At the time of the April 2005 Titan launch, other oil platforms were in the general area besides the Hibernia platform.³⁵⁶ The floating Terra Nova platform was approximately 217 miles (350 kilometers) east of St. John's.³⁵⁷

Domestically, access to space within the United States is also becoming an issue. Several new spaceports are under development, a number of which are situated away from coastal areas.³⁵⁸ However, the inland spaceports under development appear to be aiming toward reusable launch vehicles and the suborbital tourist market, so damage caused by expended boosters should not be a problem. For this type of launch, coordination with air traffic is the major concern.

Of course, agreeing on a vertical limit of state sovereignty will not alleviate the safety issues discussed above. States will still have to adopt and comply with international safety standards when conducting space launches. But a treaty delimitating vertical sovereignty could also contain provisions on launch safety and launch notification.

IV. POSSIBLE DEMARCATION

A. PAST PROPOSALS

There are many different proposals for a demarcation between air and space and many different thoughts on whether or not there is a need for demarcation.³⁵⁹ Much of the problem

³⁵³ See Dene Moore, *Nfld. Has Assurances About U.S. Missile Launch; Rigs Won't Be Evacuated*, CANADIAN PRESS, Apr. 14, 2005.

³⁵⁴ See *Rocket Launch No Problem*, LONDON FREE PRESS (Ontario), May 1, 2005, at 7.

³⁵⁵ See Moore, *Rocket Risk*, *supra* note 352.

³⁵⁶ See Moore, *Space Junk*, *supra* note 303.

³⁵⁷ See Dene Moore, *Proposed Rocket Launch Spurs More Concern For Nfld. Offshore Platforms*, CANADIAN PRESS, Apr. 8, 2005.

³⁵⁸ See OFFICE OF COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION, *supra* note 180, at 32-49.

³⁵⁹ See GRIEF, *supra* note 30, at 40.

stems from the fact that there is no clear physical boundary between air and space.³⁶⁰ The Earth's atmosphere thins as altitude increases.³⁶¹ Although after only a few miles it would be difficult for humans to survive without artificial support, traces of gases can still be measured even at altitudes as high as 10,000 miles (16,000 kilometers).³⁶²

The U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) has been formally considering the definition and delimitation of outer space since 1967.³⁶³ Several states, including the United States, do not think that there is a pressing need for demarcation.³⁶⁴ These states think that because the lack of a definite boundary has not caused a problem to this point, demarcation should wait until there is a pressing need.³⁶⁵ Other reasons against delimitation include:

- the possibility that any attempt at a treaty delimitating air and space will encourage some states to make excessive sovereignty claims;
- fears that the boundary may be established so high that some space activities could be hampered;
- an understanding that fixing the boundary at a lower altitude will not lessen the fear of some states that their security interests are threatened;
- a fear that setting a boundary now may make it impossible to change the boundary in the future, especially if the boundary has to be lowered;
- a hope that it will be possible to establish a lower boundary in the future than is conceivable now.³⁶⁶

One of the oldest proposals for delineating air and space is to limit a state's vertical sovereignty at the physical point where space begins. However, this is not a practical proposal because, as mentioned above, there is no sudden natural dividing line between air and space.³⁶⁷ Another idea would be to extend state

³⁶⁰ See *id.*

³⁶¹ See *id.*

³⁶² *Id.*

³⁶³ U.N. Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, *Historical Summary on the Consideration of the Question on the Definition and Delimitation of Outer Space*, Provisional Agenda Item 6(a) ¶ 1, U.N. Doc A/AC.105/769 (Feb. 19, 2002).

³⁶⁴ *Id.* ¶¶ 9, 12, 23.

³⁶⁵ *Id.*

³⁶⁶ See Robert F.A. Goedhart, *The Never Ending Dispute: Delimitation of Air Space and Outer Space*, in 4 FORUM FOR AIR AND SPACE LAW 6-7 (Marietta Benkő & Willem de Graaff eds., 1996).

³⁶⁷ See *id.* at 31-34.

sovereignty to the uppermost altitude at which an aircraft is capable of flying.³⁶⁸ This altitude has been estimated by Dr. Theodore von Kármán to be 275,000 feet (52 miles, or 83 kilometers).³⁶⁹ However, this is not a practical solution because advances in technology could change the maximum altitude over time unless the definition of aircraft was very specific.³⁷⁰ I also do not think this is a practical solution because it extends state sovereignty too high.³⁷¹

One traditional view was that, in order to exercise sovereignty over an area, a state must effectively control it.³⁷² A state's vertical sovereignty thus would extend as high, or as low, as that state could exercise its control.³⁷³ However, the idea of applying this rule to vertical sovereignty claims was criticized by Professor Cooper, who instead sought a uniform limit on sovereignty:

Certain jurists have insisted that the territory of a State is limited by the ability of that State to make its law effective. This is a harsh rule when applied to sovereignty in space. The richest and most powerful States now have means through high altitude rockets to control more or less effectively the "airspace" over their surface territories. But the weaker States have no such power. Can we be said to live in such a world where the physical power at any one time of any particular State determines its *international right* to consider the region above its surface territories as part of its national territory? . . . [T]he rule should be that every State, no matter how small or how weak, as a State of equal sovereignty with every other State, has and should be admitted to have territorial rights upwards above its surface territories as high as the rights of every other State no matter how powerful.³⁷⁴

I agree with Professor Cooper's rejection of this theory of demarcation.

Another proposal is a multi-level sovereignty regime first suggested by Professor Cooper.³⁷⁵ He suggested a low limit of territorial airspace, a free outer space zone above, and a "contiguous zone" in between:

³⁶⁸ See *id.* at 55–64.

³⁶⁹ *Id.* at 61.

³⁷⁰ Cooper, *High Altitude Flight*, *supra* note 32, at 263.

³⁷¹ Professor Cooper would have agreed that this proposal set the limit of state sovereignty too high; in 1965 he said that a limit of 50 miles was too high. See *supra* note 32.

³⁷² See Cooper, *High Altitude Flight*, *supra* note 32, at 263–64.

³⁷³ See *Id.*

³⁷⁴ *Id.*

³⁷⁵ Cooper, *Contiguous Zones*, *supra* note 152, at 325.

The lower boundary of this contiguous zone might be the point where normal airplane flight is practical and the upper boundary just below the point where unpowered orbital flight can be made effective. In such contiguous zone a subjacent State could exercise the same preventive and protective jurisdiction as against foreign flight instrumentalities as it has in the airspace zone except that rights of passage would be permitted for nonmilitary flight instrumentalities when ascending toward or descending from outer space above.³⁷⁶

I disagree with this proposal because, essentially, it only creates a limited right of passage. I think more freedom should be allowed and therefore do not support this idea.

Shortly after the launch of Sputnik in 1957, Dr. G. Zadorozhni, a Soviet lawyer, proposed "freedom of the air, like freedom of the high seas, should be declared for the region beyond 20 or 30 kilometres (12 or 18 miles) above the earth."³⁷⁷ I agree with the low limit in Dr. Zadorozhni's proposal and think it should have been pursued. In 1960, another Soviet lawyer, Gennady P. Zhukov, wrote that if an agreement banning military activities in space could be negotiated, a separate agreement limiting the vertical sovereignty of states to "a relatively low limit" could be achieved.³⁷⁸ Although the proposal was not too specific, I agree that a low limit on State sovereignty is the best solution.

Unfortunately, the U.S.S.R. did not press forward with the two proposals of Zadorozhni and Zhukov.³⁷⁹ In June of 1978, the U.S.S.R. permanent representative to the United Nations proposed an agreement that outer space begins at 100 to 110 kilo-

³⁷⁶ *Id.* Professor Cooper's proposal is reviewed and criticized by Robert F.A. Goedhart, who concludes:

Cooper's three-zone theory is anything but a meaningful tool to find a boundary between air space and outer space: at first Cooper's numerical proposals were confusing and arbitrary, and finally they have proved to be untenable for scientific and technological reasons.

Goedhart, *supra* note 366, at 71.

³⁷⁷ *200th Circuit by Satellite To-Day*, TIMES (London), Oct. 18, 1957, at 7.

³⁷⁸ Harry Schwartz, *U.S. Plan to Put a Man in Space Is Ridiculed by Soviet Scientist*, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1960, at 25. Mr. Zhukov was the Executive Secretary of the Space Law Committee of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences at the time he made the statement. See Robert D. Crane, *Soviet Attitude Toward International Space Law*, 56 AM. J. INT'L L. 685, 687 n.6 (1962).

³⁷⁹ Robert D. Crane, *Soviet Attitude Toward International Space Law*, 56 AM. J. INT'L L. 685, (1962).

meters (62.1 to 68.4 miles) above sea level.³⁸⁰ This altitude corresponds roughly to the lowest perigee of satellites up to the time of the proposal. The theory behind the proposal is that because no state can make claims of sovereignty in space and most satellites have had a minimum perigee of approximately 100 kilometers or higher, then 100 kilometers is the highest altitude that states can claim as their sovereign territory. Although the 100/110 kilometer (62/68 miles) altitude was not meant to be the final demarcation line, I think by proposing that altitude the U.S.S.R. precluded any discussion of a lower demarcation line. The U.S.S.R. presented a working paper outlining its proposal in June of 1979.³⁸¹ The first three proposals of the working paper were as follows:

1. The region above 100/110 kilometers altitude from the sea level of the earth is outer space.
2. The boundary between air space and outer space shall be subject to agreement among States and shall subsequently be established by a treaty at an altitude not exceeding 100/110 kilometers above sea level.
3. Space objects of States shall retain the right to fly over the territory of other States at altitudes lower than 100 (110) kilometers above sea level for the purpose of reaching orbit or returning to earth in the territory of the launching State.³⁸²

The proposal showed that the U.S.S.R. thought that a right of innocent passage had already been established because the proposal said that space objects of states "shall *retain* the right to fly over the territory of other States."³⁸³ As recently as 1996, the Russian Federation still supported this proposal.³⁸⁴ Martin Menter agreed that a right of innocent passage existed.³⁸⁵ However,

³⁸⁰ U.N. Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 183d mtg. at 48-50, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/pv.183 (1978).

³⁸¹ See U.N. Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, *Draft Basic Provisions of the General Assembly Resolution on the Delineation of Air Space and Outer Space and on the Legal Status of the Geostationary Satellites' Orbital Space*, Agenda Item 4(c), U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/L.112 (1979).

³⁸² *Id.*

³⁸³ *Id.* ¶ 3 (emphasis added).

³⁸⁴ See U.N. Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, *Questionnaire on Possible Legal Issues with Regard to Aerospace Objects: Replies from Member States*, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/635/Add.1, at 6 (Mar. 15, 1996), available at http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/reports/ac1051/AC105_635Add1E.pdf.

³⁸⁵ Martin Menter, *Status of International Space Flight*, in INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF SPACE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASTRONAUTICAL FEDERATION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-SECOND COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 67, 72 (1980).

others argue there is no customary right of innocent passage for access to space.³⁸⁶ The ICAO observer to the legal subcommittee of the COPUOS presented a paper in 1986 stating that the right of innocent passage was a proposal that did not reflect existing law.³⁸⁷ Professor Chistol noted in 1965, "[t]he major argument against the development of a rule of international law permitting innocent passage of spacecraft is that the practical dangers to the subjacent state are too profound to permit such close approach by transiting vehicles."³⁸⁸

One reason Russia may be trying to obtain international recognition of the right of innocent passage of space vehicles is that the geographic location of its principal launch site, Baikonur cosmodrome in Kazakstan, limits its potential launch azimuths.³⁸⁹ The Russian Federation, however, has taken a few actions somewhat contradicting its claim of a right of innocent passage.³⁹⁰ First, the Russian Federation allows other states innocent passage through Russian airspace to enter outer space and to return to Earth *if given prior notice*.³⁹¹ If a right of inno-

The third paragraph of the USSR proposal at the COPUOS 1979 meeting recites a right to overfly other States' territory below 100/110 kms, in going into orbit and in returning to the launching State. This would codify what I believe is currently customary international law—a State having a right of onward passage in transiting a nearby State's airspace in traveling to and returning from outer space.

Id. Professor Carl Q. Christol also thought that a right of innocent passage existed, arguing that the U.N. General Assembly resolutions and the lack of formal protests by states against

the orbiting of space vehicles for peaceful purposes at whatever altitude, very strongly suggest that just as there has developed a principle of customary international law that such orbiting is lawful, this principle must carry with it the practical corollary that innocent passage through the air space following launch and during return must be a permitted use of sovereign airspace.

Christol, *supra* note 274, at 338.

³⁸⁶ See Kelly, *supra* note 166, at 41.

³⁸⁷ See Ram Jakhu, *International Law Governing the Acquisition and Dissemination of Satellite Imagery*, 29 J. SPACE L. 65, 77 n.38 (2003) (quoting from ICAO Doc. C-WP/8158).

³⁸⁸ Christol, *supra* note 274, at 338.

³⁸⁹ See *supra* notes 314–316 and accompanying text.

³⁹⁰ See Russian Federation Act on Space Activity 1993, Decree No. 5663-1 of the Russian House of Soviets, art. 19(4) *translated at* http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/SpaceLaw/national/russian_federation/decreed_5663-1_E.html.

³⁹¹ *Id.* The provision states:

The space object of a foreign state can execute a single innocent flight through the air space of the Russian Federation with the purpose to insert such an object into an orbit around the Earth or

cent passage already existed in international law, there would be no necessity of including it in Russian domestic law.³⁹² Also, the Russian limitation that the right only exists if Russia is given prior notice would appear to contradict the norm Russia advocates; although, from a safety perspective this makes sense.³⁹³ Second, as mentioned above, the Russian Federation recently obtained permission from Turkmenistan for spent rocket stages to land in Turkmenistan.³⁹⁴ Again, if a right of innocent passage already exists, there may be no need for such an agreement. However, from a safety perspective, this also makes sense.

To enable vehicles such as Hypersoar to operate freely, both the 1979 U.S.S.R. proposal and Professor Cooper's proposal must be modified to allow unlimited nonmilitary, or non-state, activity rather than only for vehicles ascending or descending from orbit.³⁹⁵ This is required because a Hypersoar-type vehicle would never go into an orbit.³⁹⁶ Also, for the descent phase, the 1979 U.S.S.R. proposal only allows innocent passage for space objects returning to the territory of the launching state.³⁹⁷ So vehicles involved in inter-state transport would not be entitled to innocent passage.³⁹⁸ Therefore, I do not support either Professor Cooper's multi-level sovereignty proposal or the 1979 U.S.S.R. proposal.

In 2002, a member of the U.S. House of Representatives, Congressman Dennis Kucinich of Ohio, introduced H.R. 3616 which would have prohibited the U.S. from using or developing space weapons.³⁹⁹ The bill also defined space as the area starting at an altitude of 37 miles (60 kilometers).⁴⁰⁰ The bill did not pass.

further in outer space, as well as with the purpose to return it to the Earth under the condition of advance noting of appropriate services of the Russian Federation about time, place, trajectory and other conditions of such flight.

Id.

³⁹² *See id.*

³⁹³ *See id.*

³⁹⁴ *See supra* text accompanying note 313.

³⁹⁵ *See* Cooper, *Contiguous Zones*, *supra* note 152, at 325.

³⁹⁶ *See id.*

³⁹⁷ *See supra* text accompanying note 382, para. 3.

³⁹⁸ *See id.*

³⁹⁹ H.R. 3616, 107th Cong. (2002), *available at* http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/useftp.cgi?IPaddress=162.140.64.89&filename=h3616ih.pdf&directory=/disk2/wais/data/107_cong_bills.

⁴⁰⁰ *Id.* § 7.

Dr. Gbenga Oduntan recently provided a detailed review of many different demarcation theories.⁴⁰¹ Dr. Oduntan proposes a multi-level sovereignty theory similar to Professor Cooper's, with a limit of state sovereignty at an altitude of approximately 55 miles (88.5 kilometers).⁴⁰² For the reasons discussed above, I do not support this proposal. One of Dr. Oduntan's conclusions is that "the demarcation line must not be too low; as this would put a Space vehicle launcher at the mercy of surrounding states through whose airspace its vehicle must pass, on its way to or from outer space. Thus, all the low demarcation line theories must be rejected."⁴⁰³ Similarly, Dr. Oduntan reaches the conclusion that to ensure a state's security, the demarcation line "must not be too high."⁴⁰⁴ I also do not agree with these conclusions and think a low demarcation line would provide greater freedom to launching states.

B. FUNCTIONALISM AND SPATIALISM

Some states and scholars subscribe to the functionalist view.⁴⁰⁵ "The essence of the functionalists' argument is that the *locus* of an act need be of no moment to its legality or illegality, which can be determined solely by reference to its nature."⁴⁰⁶ This view takes the position that objects in space should be governed by space law, and objects not in space should be governed by air law.⁴⁰⁷ The existing space law treaties were written in a functionalist way to avoid the boundary problem.⁴⁰⁸ For instance, the Outer Space Treaty does not define space.⁴⁰⁹ As discussed above, the Liability Convention does not define the term space object.⁴¹⁰ Finally, the CONVENTION ON REGISTRATION of Objects Launched into Outer Space [the Registration Convention]⁴¹¹

⁴⁰¹ See generally Dr. Gbenga Oduntan, *The Never Ending Dispute: Legal Theories on the Spatial Demarcation Boundary Plane between Airspace and Outer Space*, 1 HERTFORDSHIRE L. J. 64 (2003), available at http://perseus.herts.ac.uk/uinfo/library/i89918_3.pdf.

⁴⁰² *Id.* at 82.

⁴⁰³ See *id.*

⁴⁰⁴ See *id.*

⁴⁰⁵ See e.g., Cheng, *The Boundary Problem*, *supra* note 182, at 445.

⁴⁰⁶ *Id.*

⁴⁰⁷ GRIEF, *supra* note 30, at 40.

⁴⁰⁸ See generally, e.g., Outer Space Treaty, *supra* note 6.

⁴⁰⁹ *Id.*

⁴¹⁰ See *supra* text accompanying notes 334–336.

⁴¹¹ Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Jan. 14, 1975, 28 U.S.T. 695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15.

does not explicitly define the term "space objects," but specifies that certain information about objects launched "into earth orbit or beyond" must be provided to the Secretary General of the United Nations.⁴¹²

Mr. Menter frequently expressed a functionalist view and argued against the need to delineate a boundary between air and space.⁴¹³ Writing shortly after the signing of the Outer Space Treaty, he said:

Space law writers, it is to be hoped, may agree that the proposed treaty—in declaring outer space free for use by all states, and in declaring that the exploration and use of outer space is to be guided by the principle of cooperation and mutual assistance with due regard for the corresponding interest of other states—should abate past pressures for determining just where sovereignty ends and free outer space begins. Those pressures should be further abated by the functional approach. For example, the treaty's prohibition against the orbiting of weapons of mass destruction applies to any vehicle in orbit, regardless of the distance of the orbit from the surface of the earth. Protection of the state was what led historically to firm claims of sovereignty over the territorial sea and to a nation's superadjacent air space. Protection of the subjacent state will argue against agreement to any fixed distance so long as equal danger may exist from above such a point.⁴¹⁴

The opposing perspective is the spatialist view.⁴¹⁵ Those subscribing to this view think that a definitive demarcation line should be drawn between air and space.⁴¹⁶ This would impose a vertical limit on state sovereignty. Professor Cheng discussed the interplay of the functional and spatial views:

It will be readily perceived . . . that the functional classification of activities of States into those that are lawful and those that are unlawful *follows*—and *not precedes*—spatial delimitation. Contrary to the view of some functionalists, spatialism does not mean doing away with a functional classification of what is a lawful activity and what is not, but to apply a functional test without regard to where an activity takes place is not only to put the cart before the horse, but to dispense with the horse. Under general interna-

⁴¹² *Id.* arts. I–IV.

⁴¹³ Martin Menter, *The Developing Law for Outer Space*, 53 A.B.A. J. 703, 705 (1967).

⁴¹⁴ *Id.*

⁴¹⁵ See *Historical Summary on the Consideration of the Question on the Definition and Delimitation of Outer Space*, *supra* note 398, ¶ 11.

⁴¹⁶ *Id.*

tional law, there are in fact few activities of States that are either universally lawful or universally unlawful. Most of the time, it depends on where an activity is carried out. Thus the answer to the question, for instance, whether a State may arrest a foreign vessel or not for monitoring its electronic defen[s]e [sic] installations will depend not on the nature of such actions but primarily on the *locus*, i.e., on whether the act of intelligence-gathering and the arrest are carried out in a State's own territory, in the territory of another State, on the high seas, in no man's land, or in an area which is the common heritage of mankind; and secondarily on the relationship between the State and the vessel, i.e., on whether the ship has the nationality of the State, has no nationality or has a foreign nationality.⁴¹⁷

Later in the same article he wrote:

To say that spatialism should give way to functionalism in international law or in international space law would be like saying, in a nominally federal State, that everything should be treated as a federal matter to be governed directly by federal law. This would eliminate at a stroke all the rights and laws of the constituent states or provinces which after all are only a form of spatialism. In the same way, functionalism in the matter of defining outer space, by asserting that, insofar as 'lawful' space activities (their 'lawfulness' being no doubt defined in the end by the mere say so of the major space powers) are concerned, they may be conducted anywhere in the world without spatial restriction, is in effect implying that such activities may be carried on even in the national airspace of other States. Under functionalism, States would, therefore, lose the right which they have by reason of their sovereignty, to control or in any way interfere with self-styled 'lawful' foreign space activities in their national airspace.⁴¹⁸

I agree with Professor Cheng.

One concern with any spatial approach would be how to establish a uniform vertical limit: what happens over mountain ranges or deep valleys?⁴¹⁹ This same problem was examined in 1910 by Dr. J. F. Lycklama à Nijeholt:

Were the surface of the earth smooth and even, the airfrontier would be at the same height up in the air all over the globe, smooth and even also. The earth's surface, however, being far from smooth, we are faced with the alternative, must the limit of

⁴¹⁷ Cheng, *The Boundary Problem*, *supra* note 182, at 437.

⁴¹⁸ *Id.* at 443–44.

⁴¹⁹ *See id.*

sovereignty be measured from some certain, recognized, universal mark, or must it follow all the ups and downs of the soil?

A strong argument against the first solution would be that one would be obliged to place the limit at a very great height to make sure that the highest parts of the soil do not tower above the sphere of sovereignty. This solution is, moreover, unjust towards high lands, these getting the limit of their authority much nearer their territory than low lands do.

The second solution, making the airfrontier follow every unevenness of the soil, seems to be much more reasonable. But there are sound objections also against this one. For assuming such a limit of the authority in the air, means taking a measure which will be a great nuisance for everyone who has to reckon with it, a measure, moreover, that is very unjust towards low lands, as the atmosphere certainly does not follow all the ups and downs. The air being much thinner on the top of a high mountain than at its [sic] base, the addition of a sphere of sovereignty of the same extent above high lands and above low lands, will put these two categories of countries in a different position towards aerial navigation. For the high land an airdomain of considerably little height will be sufficient to bring almost all aerial traffic below its air boundary. For the low land on the contrary an airdomain of the same height will be of little value, aerial navigation being able to remain without much difficulty beyond the airboarders of such a state. At any rate, aeronauts find above the airfrontier of the low land a zone that is far more favorable for breathing and for aerial navigation than the zone they find above the airdomain of high lands. Accordingly it will be much easier to keep or get out of the way of the authority of the low land than of the high land.

Both solutions are unequal and unsatisfactory. The objections against the horizontal limit, it seems to us, are unable to be removed.⁴²⁰

This problem is similar to that encountered during the debates about how to determine historic bays and "baselines" for the territorial seas.⁴²¹ Unfortunately, those rules became very complicated⁴²² and many international incidents have occurred because of differing interpretations of the Law of the Sea Convention.⁴²³

⁴²⁰ NIJEHOLT, *supra* note 37, at 31-32. Dr. Nijeholt went on to argue against a vertical limit on State sovereignty. See *id.* at 32-33.

⁴²¹ See *supra* notes 99-109 and accompanying text.

⁴²² See *Id.*

⁴²³ See *infra* notes 429-447 and accompanying text.

C. FILLING A GAP IN THE LAW

Although as mentioned above many people think that from a legal perspective space "begins" at 100 kilometers, not everyone agrees.⁴²⁴ Referring to HyperSoar, the authors of one article wrote that "the space plane's high altitudes would make foreign airspace restrictions irrelevant" although HyperSoar would never ascend above 100 kilometers.⁴²⁵

In the 1970s as the U.S. space shuttle neared operation, many legal experts thought that its deployment would necessitate delineation of air and space. Mr. Menter, however, wrote that the space shuttle should not change the conclusion he made about delineation in 1967 because the space shuttle cannot maneuver in the atmosphere like a traditional aircraft and therefore is not a threat.⁴²⁶ "I believe a subjacent State's tolerance of the flight of a future aerospacecraft above it will continue to depend on whether such craft constitutes a present danger rather than whether it is plus or minus a few miles of a fluctuating demarcation line whose height above it is dependent upon its terrain elevation."⁴²⁷ However, in 1964, Mr. Johnson rejected a similar argument:

Resorting again to the analogy of the sea, it is obvious that the ability of the same vessel to sail close to shore and in the middle of the ocean, utilizing with equal facility the territorial waters and the high seas, has never suggested that there should be no definable limit to the exclusive power of the littoral State, even though agreement on such a limit is difficult to achieve. . . .

Similarly, the prospect that a single craft may eventually operate at all altitudes in the air-space continuum does not mean that there is no need to limit with precision the exclusive power of the underlying State. In fact, it probably emphasizes the need for an eventual solution.⁴²⁸

Elizabeth Kelly discussed the impact of "spaceplanes," and although she did not propose a specific boundary, she argued against extending State sovereignty up to 100 kilometers:

⁴²⁴ Lowe & Levine, *supra* note 189.

⁴²⁵ *Id.*

⁴²⁶ Martin Menter, *Legal Regime of International Space Flight*, in INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF SPACE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASTRONAUTICAL FEDERATION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-FIRST COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 126, 134 (Mortimer D. Schwartz ed., 1979) [hereinafter Menter, *Legal Regime*].

⁴²⁷ *Id.*

⁴²⁸ Johnson, *Freedom and Control*, *supra* note 7, at 141-42.

Spaceplanes able to fly freely through airspace and outer space are a very real reason for maintaining flexibility as regards demarcation between airspace and outer space. They bespeak the imprudence in advocating that states establish a boundary at 100km, customarily or conventionally. Such a boundary might leave enough of a cushion of airspace for conventional aircraft, but it might not be low enough for spaceplanes to operate efficiently and escape claims of violation of airspace sovereignty.⁴²⁹

While pointing out the necessity of defining the limit of vertical sovereignty, Professor Cheng pointed out that states claiming territorial seas of various widths never caused a problem because each state knew how much the other states claimed:

The statement has sometimes also been made that no great harm has arisen out of the lack of a general agreement on the precise outer limit of the territorial sea and the same should be true of territorial space, but this ignores the fact that, although there is no general agreement, the precise limit of the territorial sea claimed by the coastal State is always known.⁴³⁰

Professor Cooper made a similar argument:

It has been said that there is no general agreement as to the outer boundary of territorial waters and this fact has been used as an argument to support delay in reaching agreement as to the boundary between the airspace and outer space. The argument is unsound so far as it applies to our national action. It overlooks the fact that every State which has maritime boundaries has formally asserted a fixed outer boundary for its territorial waters so that no other State can question its position.⁴³¹

Unfortunately, although it may be possible to determine the claim made by states, both of these statements miss one important point: although states frequently published their maritime claims, these claims are not always understood, uniformly interpreted, or recognized by other states and many problems have arisen. Professor Cheng discussed an incident in which a U.S. radio frequency intelligence ship, the U.S.S. Pueblo, was seized in 1968 and its crew held for almost eleven months by North Korea.⁴³² The United States said the ship was in international waters about 25 miles (40 kilometers) off the coast of North Ko-

⁴²⁹ Kelly, *supra* note 166, at 111.

⁴³⁰ Cheng, *The Boundary Problem*, *supra* note 182, at 446.

⁴³¹ John Cobb Cooper, *The Boundary Between Territorial Airspace and International Outer Space*, reprinted in COOPER, *EXPLORATIONS IN AEROSPACE LAW*, *supra* note 25, at 298, 300.

⁴³² See Cheng, *The Boundary Problem*, *supra* note 182, at 446.

rea when it was boarded, although North Korea claimed it had intruded into its territorial waters.⁴³³

Incidents of this nature are not uncommon.⁴³⁴ One infamous example of the dangers involved occurred in the Corfu Channel.⁴³⁵ On October 22, 1946, two U.K. destroyers were severely damaged and many sailors died after the ships struck sea mines while steaming through the Corfu Channel.⁴³⁶ The channel is between Albania and Corfu Island and is within Albania's territorial waters.⁴³⁷ The mines that damaged the U.K. destroyers were placed in the channel by Albania.⁴³⁸ Albania acknowledged the existence of the strait, but denied that it was an international waterway and asserted that foreign warships required prior authorization to use the strait.⁴³⁹ The International Court of Justice found Albania responsible for placing the mines in violation of international law.⁴⁴⁰ As recently as the year 2000, Albania still required prior authorization for foreign warships to enter its territorial sea.⁴⁴¹ In the early and mid-1980s, the United States and Libya clashed several times over Libya's claims to the Gulf of Sidra.⁴⁴² In 2001, Libya still claimed the Gulf of Sidra as internal waters.⁴⁴³ More recently, in 1992, a U.S. Navy submarine collided with a Russian Navy submarine apparently because the two states did not recognize the Russian territorial claims uniformly.⁴⁴⁴ The United States claimed the submarine was 14 miles (22.5 kilometers) offshore at the time of the inci-

⁴³³ See Neil Sheehan, *North Korea Seizes Navy Ship, Holds 83 on Board as U.S. Spies*, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1968, at 1. The United States said the ship was located at 39 degrees, 25 minutes North Latitude and 127 degrees, 54.3 minutes East Longitude. See *id.* U.S. Rear Admiral John V. Smith said the ship was 16 nm (18.4 miles or 29.6 kilometers) from the coast when the confrontation began. *Id.* However, the U.S.S.R. delegate to the U.N. Security Council said the ship intruded into North Korea waters at 39 degrees, 17 minutes, and 4 seconds North Latitude and 127 degrees, 46 minutes, and 9 seconds East Longitude. *Excerpts from U.S. and Soviet Statements in U.N. Council*, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1968, at 6.

⁴³⁴ See *Mines in Corfu Channel*, TIMES (London), Nov. 13, 1946, at 6.

⁴³⁵ See *id.*

⁴³⁶ *Id.*

⁴³⁷ *Id.*

⁴³⁸ *Id.*

⁴³⁹ *Id.*

⁴⁴⁰ *Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.)*, 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9).

⁴⁴¹ COHEN, 2000 REPORT, *supra* note 108, app. H.

⁴⁴² GRIEF, *supra* note 30, at 18.

⁴⁴³ COHEN, 2001 REPORT, *supra* note 116, app. H.

⁴⁴⁴ Astley & Schmitt, *supra* note 96, at 128.

dent,⁴⁴⁵ although Russia claimed the submarine was 4.7 miles (7.6 kilometers) within its territorial waters.⁴⁴⁶ The collision apparently occurred because Russia claimed a straight baseline across the Kola Bay.⁴⁴⁷ "[B]ecause of the differing baseline calculations, part of the claimed Russian territorial sea lay in what the [U.S.] considered to be international waters."⁴⁴⁸ At the time, retired U.S. Navy Rear Admiral Robert Long said that in the past "the Russians have made extravagant claims for their territorial waters."⁴⁴⁹ Recall the greatly exaggerated maritime claims of the U.S.S.R. discussed above.

Similar incidents may be avoided in the future in the air by explicitly defining the extent of a state's vertical sovereignty.

D. PROPOSING A BOUNDARY

The ultimate goal, when reasonable security needs are met, should be of course, after the model of the oceans, the fullest inclusive use of airspace. Economic considerations strongly suggest that with respect to airspace, as with respect to the oceans, outer space, and other sharable resources, the greatest production of values can be secured through the fullest inclusive use.⁴⁵⁰

I agree that the territorial sea model should be adopted to define vertical sovereignty. A process similar to the evolution in the law of the sea's codification of territorial sea limits could occur in the atmosphere to define the vertical limits of state sov-

⁴⁴⁵ David Evans, *Insider to Probe Collision of Subs*, CHICAGO TRIB., Feb. 20, 1992, at 5.

⁴⁴⁶ *Izvestia: CIS and US Sub Collision Was in Russian Waters*, ITAR-TASS, Feb. 20, 1992.

⁴⁴⁷ Astley & Schmitt, *supra* note 96, at 128 fig. 7 (depicting the territorial sea boundaries as determined by Russia and the United States).

⁴⁴⁸ *Id.* at 128.

⁴⁴⁹ Evans, *supra* note 445.

⁴⁵⁰ McDUGAL ET AL., *supra* note 20, at 279 (footnotes omitted). Although they did not propose a specific altitude for a boundary, Professors McDougal, Lasswell, and Vlasic wrote later in their book that if a demarcation was established,

the line separating the region of a comprehensive, exclusive competence from that of inclusive competence [can] be drawn as low as states can be persuaded to agree. Such a temporary upper boundary could be set high enough to provide reasonable protection for traditional airspace uses, as long as this protection is generally demanded. The closer to the surface of the earth such a boundary could be fixed the greater of course would be the protection of the common interest in expanding inclusive use.

Id. at 356 (footnote omitted).

ereignty. I propose a 12 nm limit. This equates to 72,912 feet (or 22 kilometers). The area above 12 nm would not be subject to state sovereignty. It would be treated in a manner similar to airspace over international waters.⁴⁵¹ The standards and procedures adopted by ICAO would be mandatory. Vehicles operating above 12 nm would have to comply with ICAO standards.

Any rule delineating vertical sovereignty must be extremely simple to avoid the problems demonstrated in the territorial sea analogy. For vertical sovereignty, a more uniform result could be achieved by ignoring mountain ranges and other geographic features. The limit could be set in a manner similar to aircraft "flight levels,"⁴⁵² but by using satellite positioning, or some other accurate positioning system, to determine vertical position rather than barometric pressure. Although this solution produces the problem noted by Dr. Nijeholt above,⁴⁵³ the 12 nm vertical limit is so high that it will include all current commercial aviation. Also, the simplicity of this rule will mean that states should not be able to adopt different interpretations.

As stated above, setting the limit at this altitude would not interfere with current aviation, because the limit would be well above the maximum altitude of current commercial aircraft.⁴⁵⁴ In the United States, the maximum altitude for commercial airliners is effectively limited to 40,000 feet (12 kilometers) due to FAA regulations.⁴⁵⁵ This is because it is impossible for airliners with wing-mounted engines to meet technical standards required by FAA regulations to operate at higher altitudes.⁴⁵⁶

However desirable a low vertical limit of state sovereignty is from either a freedom of access to space or a freedom of navigation in space perspective, it seems likely that many states will be

⁴⁵¹ Chicago Convention, *supra* note 23, art. 12. This article provides in part, "[o]ver the high seas, the rules in force shall be those established under this Convention." *Id.* This means the international standards and procedures adopted by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) are mandatory over the high seas. *See id.* art. 37.

⁴⁵² AbsoluteAstronomy.com, Flight Level, http://www.absoluteastronomy.com/encyclopedia/f/fl/flight_level.htm (last visited June 14, 2005).

⁴⁵³ *See supra* text accompanying note 420.

⁴⁵⁴ GRIEF, *supra* note 30, at 42 (asserting that aircraft have a flight ceiling of "about 12 miles, [although] the upper limit of effective aerodynamic lift is considered to be about 25 miles above the earth" (footnotes omitted)).

⁴⁵⁵ Andrew Doyle, *FAA Pressed on Altitude Limits*, FLIGHT INT'L, Feb. 8, 2005, at 17.

⁴⁵⁶ *Id.* The applicable FAA rule is Standards for Approval for High Altitude Operation of Subsonic Transport Airplanes 61 Fed. Reg. 28,684 (June 5, 1996) (*to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 25*).

reluctant to agree to a low limit. First, because under the functional perspective that exists in current treaties, satellites in orbit operate beyond individual state's sovereignty, "States would be unlikely to accept 25 miles as the upper limit of their territorial sovereignty when they could claim considerably more than this without interfering with satellites in earth orbit."⁴⁵⁷ Second, states will be reluctant to allow freedom of navigation if they are unable to immediately benefit from it. States with no ability or desire to operate vehicles in this region may be unwilling to enter into an agreement granting another state's vehicles landing rights, especially if the foreign carrier is competing with a domestic carrier. Professor Cheng elaborated on this issue:

A solely functional approach of allowing the airlines to fly wherever there is traffic, while seemingly most rational can, in the present what economists would call conditions of very imperfect competition, lead easily to the entire industry being completely dominated, if not forever monopolized, by a few strong carrier nations. Interestingly enough, such nations have always been championing the cause of complete freedom of the air. The parallel between aeronautics and astronautics . . . should not be overlooked by those interested in the definition of outer space.⁴⁵⁸

Later in the same article, Professor Cheng wrote:

While among space powers or near-space powers, [a right of transit], in the expectation of reciprocity, may be easily granted, the same can hardly be said of States which have no aspiration to go into space. The price the latter will exact will probably be proportionate to their strategic importance for the passage of space objects. In any event, if air law is anything to go by, it is most likely that States will wish to distinguish between military and non-military space objects, and, amongst the latter, possibly between commercial and non-commercial, and between nuclear and non-nuclear space objects.⁴⁵⁹

States may not want to give up the possibility of using their geographic location to gain economic benefits by demanding fees for overflight rights.⁴⁶⁰ Writing of aircraft transit issues, Pro-

⁴⁵⁷ GRIEF, *supra* note 30, at 43.

⁴⁵⁸ Cheng, *The Boundary Problem*, *supra* note 182, at 443.

⁴⁵⁹ *Id.* at 453.

⁴⁶⁰ According to Professors McDougal, Lasswell, and Vlasic:

Fear of competition, opportunities for unilateral grab, prospects of easy enrichment without concomitant investment or risk, and the like—the motives which have been for decades growing in the shadow of "exclusive and complete sovereignty" over territorial air-

fessor Peter P.C. Haanappel said that "States with large territories are in the best political position to use overflight rights as a bargaining tool, commercial or political, in individual negotiations with other States. Often, large States have important commercial air routes crossing their territories."⁴⁶¹ Russia apparently already charges non-Russian airlines "royalties" for the right to fly over its territory in contradiction to the non-discrimination provision of article 15⁴⁶² of the Chicago Convention.⁴⁶³ In addition to the royalties it charges, Russia has some of the highest air navigation charges in the world.⁴⁶⁴

State security is also often cited as the major argument against a low limit on vertical sovereignty.⁴⁶⁵ For example, according to Professor Cheng:

The foremost consideration that will influence the attitude of States in reaching a decision on [the exact height of national sovereignty] will be . . . that of national security. While it is true that in these days of reconnaissance earth satellites and intercontinental ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads, any system of national defence [sic] based purely on physical distance seems ruefully obsolete, yet if the history of air law offers any guide, States will most probably prefer to claim the greatest height practicable as the limit of their national space⁴⁶⁶

But security fears should be no greater than already exist today. States can already orbit weapons above other States and surveillance has long been accepted. A potential enemy at an altitude of 12 nm would be no closer than is already allowed by the law of the sea or across a land border. The ability to actually maneuver above 12 nm and remain there for any period of time is very

space—should not, of course, be allowed in the future to stand in the way of common interest.

McDOUGAL ET AL., *supra* note 25, at 279 (footnotes omitted).

⁴⁶¹ Peter P.C. Haanappel, *Recent European Air Transport Developments: 1992–93*, XVIII:I ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 133, 143 (1993).

⁴⁶² Article 15 of the Chicago Convention provides in part: "No fees, dues or other charges shall be imposed by any contracting State in respect solely of the right of transit over or entry into or exit from its territory of any aircraft of a contracting State or persons or property thereon." Chicago Convention, *supra* note 23, art. 15.

⁴⁶³ Michael Milde, *Some Question Marks About the Price of "Russian Air"*, 49 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR LUFT- UND WELTRAUMRECHT [Z.L.W.] 147 (2000), reprinted in 2 MICHAEL MILDE ET AL., PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL AIR LAW 226, 226 (2004).

⁴⁶⁴ *Id.* at 229 (citing ICAO Doc. 7100 (1999)).

⁴⁶⁵ See e.g., Bin Cheng, *From Air Law to Space Law*, reprinted in CHENG, SPACE LAW, *supra* note 182, at 35 (footnote omitted).

⁴⁶⁶ *Id.*

difficult,⁴⁶⁷ so there should be few immediate threats posed by this proposal. Territorial seas as buffer areas for security are almost meaningless today because of bombers with intercontinental range, long-range carrier-based attack aircraft, submarine launched ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and various other weapons.⁴⁶⁸ In addition, states have always had to contend with land borders that provide no security buffer.

Finally, states have always had a right to take action outside their borders to protect their security,⁴⁶⁹ and setting a low vertical limit on state sovereignty will not change this right. A 12 nm vertical limit of state sovereignty should not be objected to for security concerns. States should not be allowed to claim extensive vertical sovereignty based on outdated security concerns.

Some states have recently realized that they can enhance their security by allowing aircraft of other states to fly over them for surveillance.⁴⁷⁰ The Treaty on Open Skies establishes a regime

⁴⁶⁷ According to M.V. Smith:

Between the ceiling of aviation and the floor of astronautics, there is a region nearly 65 miles wide that divides air and space. This is the transverse region, wherein neither aerodynamic flight nor orbital rotation is possible. . . .

. . . .

Operations inside the transverse region are not practical because the energy expenditures required to maneuver there are too great. Vehicles can exploit neither Bernoulli's aerodynamic principles nor Kepler's astrodynamic principles to maneuver or conserve energy. Consequently, the transverse region lives up to its name as a boundary across which vehicles travel but in which they can do little else.

M. V. Smith, TEN PROPOSITIONS REGARDING SPACEPOWER 5-6 (2002).

⁴⁶⁸ MURCHISON, *supra* note 85, at 55 (noting radars observing an attack at a range of 2000 miles would only provide approximately three hours of warning time).

⁴⁶⁹ U.N. Charter art. 51. See Becker, *U.S. Foreign Policy*, *supra* note 82, at 6.

Article 51 of the United Nations Charter reserves to each of the members of the United Nations an 'inherent right' of individual or collective self-defense against armed attack. It is immaterial whether the attack originates in or passes through outer space in order to reach a member state. In such a case, that state has the right to defend itself

Id. See also Goedhart, *supra* note 366, at 74 ("Whenever a State finds itself threatened from outer space, it is still free, pursuant to article 51 of the U.N. Charter, to act in self-defence outside national air space."); Johnson, *Freedom and Control*, *supra* note 7, at 142 ("The extent of territorial sovereignty is not the test in [security] matters; the right of self-defense is not confined to actions within the defending nation's own territorial jurisdiction.").

⁴⁷⁰ See Treaty on Open Skies art. I., Mar. 24, 199, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 102-37 (1992).

for states to conduct observation flights over the territories of other states' parties.⁴⁷¹ There are currently thirty parties to the treaty.⁴⁷² The United States and Russia have agreed to allow 42 annual observation flights by aircraft from other states over their territory.⁴⁷³ Although this treaty only grants a limited right to other states, it may be an indication that some states do not see overflight by foreign aircraft as a security threat and may allow a lower vertical sovereignty limit.⁴⁷⁴

As recently as the 1950s, unification of the territorial limits within the law of the sea looked difficult to achieve. However, although a few problems still exist, the limits of territorial claims by coastal states have been unified in a relatively short period of time. This shows that states recognized the value of the greatest possible freedom of navigation over the seas and were willing to limit their own security interests to obtain the corresponding benefits. Hopefully states will recognize the long-term benefits of setting a low vertical limit of state sovereignty. The economic drag created by extensive vertical state sovereignty will be a big hurdle to overcome. In this respect, the words of Professor Haanappel regarding sovereignty over air space apply:

Even in 1944, when the Chicago Convention was drafted and opened for States' signatures, many States reali[z]ed that the absence of the right of innocent passage in international civil aviation could hamper the development of international air transport. Frequently, international air routes cross a multitude of foreign territories. Negotiating overflight rights with each individual nation concerned may be extremely cumbersome and time-consuming.⁴⁷⁵

Even with overflight rights guaranteed by bilateral and multilateral agreements, airlines frequently find conditions placed on

⁴⁷¹ *Id.*

⁴⁷² The 30 states that are Parties to the Treaty on Open Skies are: Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, Ukraine, and United States. Kyrgyzstan has signed but not yet ratified. See U.S. Dep't of Defense, *Fact Sheet: Open Skies Treaty*, <http://www.state.gov/t/ac/rls/fs/2004/33147.htm> (last visited June 7, 2005).

⁴⁷³ James A. Baker III, U.S. Dep't of State, Letter of Submittal (Aug. 12, 1992), reprinted at S. Treaty Doc. No. 102-37, at 6, 13.

⁴⁷⁴ See *id.*

⁴⁷⁵ Haanappel, *supra* note 461, at 142.

their entry into a foreign state's airspace.⁴⁷⁶ For example, the United States now requires commercial aircraft flights originating in foreign states destined to land in the United States or *overflying United States territorial airspace without landing* to provide names and other information on everyone on-board the aircraft.⁴⁷⁷ If the vertical limit of state sovereignty continues up to the point where orbital mechanics are possible, obtaining the number of overflight rights through bilateral agreements required for a simple trip by a Hypersoar-type vehicle could be very cumbersome and time-consuming. Existing bilateral agreements for aircraft would probably not be considered to apply to a Hypersoar-type vehicle, so new agreements would have to be negotiated. Although bilateral agreements would still be required to allow a Hypersoar-type vehicle to descend into a foreign state's territorial airspace to land, fewer would be required than if an agreement was needed for every state that the vehicle passed over.

Mr. Becker, in his address to Congress in 1958 discussing the law of the sea, said that the "United States Government believes that the 3-mile limit, which affords a maximum freedom of the seas, is in the best interests of all states—large and small, old and new."⁴⁷⁸ The same holds true for vertical sovereignty. Although it is probably impossible to turn back the idea of total sovereignty over airspace, it may be possible for states to see the benefits of setting a low vertical limit to state sovereignty.

E. INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS FOR OPERATIONS IN NEAR SPACE

Whether or not my proposal on delineation is accepted, eventually vehicles of various types will begin operating in the near space area. It is important that international standards be developed to ensure these vehicles are designed to be safe and operate safely in harmony with existing air traffic. The question is who will develop the standards and when they will be developed.

In 1956, Professor Cooper argued that ICAO was the best international organization to regulate and control the "use of all areas of space for non-military purposes."⁴⁷⁹ Professor Cooper had the general subject of outer space sovereignty placed on the

⁴⁷⁶ See, e.g., *id.*

⁴⁷⁷ Electronic Transmission of Passenger and Crew Manifests for Vessels and Aircraft, 70 Fed. Reg. 17,820 (Apr. 7, 2005).

⁴⁷⁸ Becker, Political Problems, *supra* note 87, at 834.

⁴⁷⁹ Cooper, *Upper Space*, *supra* note 79, at 277.

agenda for the Tenth Session of the ICAO World Assembly in June 1956.⁴⁸⁰ Although the issue was discussed at the meeting, the United States took the position that international discussion of space sovereignty was premature and Professor Cooper's proposal was tabled.⁴⁸¹ But, in its report, the ICAO legal commission wrote:

the Commission noted the growing interest among jurists in the problems concerning "Outer Space." It considers that these problems fall essentially within the province of the functions of the Organization and that, at a suitable time, they might be included in the general work program of the Legal Committee.⁴⁸²

After the flight of Sputnik, the ICAO President, Walter Binaghi, wrote to the U.S. ICAO Council Representative asking if it was time to consider the issue of sovereignty in outer space.⁴⁸³ However, based partially on U.S. opposition, President Binaghi agreed to delay ICAO consideration of this issue, although some other states wanted ICAO to proceed on the subject.⁴⁸⁴ One of the reasons the United States opposed ICAO authority over space after Sputnik was that the U.S.S.R. was not a party to the Chicago Convention.⁴⁸⁵ Professor Cooper also admitted that once Sputnik was launched, ICAO lost its chance to coordinate space law for the same reason.⁴⁸⁶ However, the U.S.S.R. became a party to the Chicago Convention on October 15, 1970, and Russia is a member now.⁴⁸⁷

⁴⁸⁰ TERRILL, *supra* note 148, at 20.

⁴⁸¹ *Id.* at 25.

⁴⁸² International Civil Aviation Organization, *Legal Commission Final Report and Minutes, Assembly—Tenth Session*, 6 para. 12, ICAO Doc. 7712, A10-LE/5 (1956), available at http://www.icao.int/icao/en/assembl/a10/docs/a10_le02.djvu.

⁴⁸³ TERRILL, *supra* note 148, at 28.

⁴⁸⁴ *Id.* at 29.

⁴⁸⁵ *Id.* at 30.

⁴⁸⁶ John Cobb Cooper, *The Russian Satellite—Legal and Political Problems*, 24 J. AIR L. & COM. 379 (1957), reprinted in COOPER, *EXPLORATIONS IN AEROSPACE LAW*, *supra* note 25, at 279, 285.

Until the Russian Satellite was launched, I had hoped that [international control of space] could be lodged in the International Civil Aviation Organization, created under the Chicago Convention. That is no longer practical. The U.S.S.R. has taken the lead. ICAO had an opportunity in 1956 to express its views about upper space when it was on the agenda at the Caracas Assembly. It failed to do so. The U.S.S.R. is not a member of ICAO. Only the United Nations itself can now serve as a forum for further discussion.

Id.

⁴⁸⁷ *Status of Chicago Convention*, *supra* note 67.

Mr. Menter frequently argued that ICAO should have jurisdiction over space flight.⁴⁸⁸ He argued in favor of giving ICAO responsibility for space activities as well as air activities, writing that "much governing regulation would tend to be similar."⁴⁸⁹ Some may argue that COPUOS would be a better organization to coordinate international space activities, but "the ICAO approach need not remove UNCOPUOS of its responsibilities."⁴⁹⁰ Professor Paul Larsen wrote:

It must be emphasized that ICAO cannot leave regulation of outer space activities to the U.N. Committee for Peaceful Uses of Outer Space because that committee is not concerned with aviation, only with outer space. Rockets and space vehicles in airspace will remain unregulated, unless ICAO enters the field or unless a new central space agency assumes this function.⁴⁹¹

According to Professor Hamilton DeSaussure, "the implementation of the legal problems which will emerge from advanced use of Outer Space are far beyond the competence of COPUOS. Although a permanent committee with continuing staff assistance, COPUOS is best suited for creating hallmark principles, but not for detailed regulation and amplification."⁴⁹² However, Professor DeSaussure thought a new agency should be created and proposals for a "super ICAO style agency" were "too drastic, too unrealistic, and too costly."⁴⁹³

I think ICAO is the proper organization to help develop standards for operations in near space. Using ICAO to develop standards for near space activities would allow utilization of an efficient, established, international organization with almost

⁴⁸⁸ Martin Menter, *Legal Responsibility for Outer Space Activities*, in INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF SPACE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASTRONAUTICAL FEDERATION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-SIXTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 121, 125 (1984) ("As to international surveillant authority, I have long favored a long range expansion of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)'s responsibilities to include space flight.").

⁴⁸⁹ Menter, *Legal Regime*, *supra* note 426, at 129.

⁴⁹⁰ *Id.* at 132.

⁴⁹¹ Paul B. Larsen, *Space Activities and Their Effect on International Civil Aviation*, in INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF SPACE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASTRONAUTICAL FEDERATION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE NINTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 159, 164 (1967).

⁴⁹² Hamilton DeSaussure, *Evolution Toward an International Space Agency*, in INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF SPACE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASTRONAUTICAL FEDERATION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE NINETEENTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 32, 35, 36 (1977).

⁴⁹³ *Id.* at 37.

universal membership.⁴⁹⁴ ICAO has over fifty years of experience drafting standards that help ensure flight safety. ICAO has also successfully drafted several treaties that have now been widely ratified. It could translate this experience into the near space realm. Giving this authority to ICAO would avoid the following problems: the large expense of creating a new international treaty organization; waiting for states to ratify the new treaty; waiting for the new organization to hire personnel and develop internal rules; and the creation of a rivalry over jurisdiction, funding, and relevance between ICAO and the new organization that would be created if ICAO is not given authority for near space.

Standards should be written covering the following issues: crew licensing, crew composition, vehicle safety, range safety, publication of launches, coordination between launch sites and air traffic control, publication of notices to mariners, use of expendable boosters, hazardous residue remaining in spent boosters, operation of HAPS, orbit locations for HAPS, and many other areas. Although the Liability Convention could apply to near space operations if an international agreement delineating space is developed and ratified, for passenger travel in near space it may be better to modify the Montreal Convention.⁴⁹⁵ ICAO would be instrumental in doing this.

These standards will be needed sooner or later. I think it would be better to start working on them now when there is time to thoroughly think them through rather than rushing to fix a problem after something goes wrong. I think ICAO is the best organization to start developing these standards and ICAO could relatively quickly obtain the expertise needed to do this.

V. CONCLUSION

There is no international agreement on the vertical limit of state sovereignty. Today, the need to settle this gap in the law is growing in importance. It is time to delineate the vertical extent of a state's sovereignty. State sovereignty should be limited to a low altitude—I recommend 12 nm. Like the 12 nm limitation on territorial waters found in the Law of the Sea Convention, this low limit will allow the greatest freedom for all states to utilize the near space area. Although few states are in a position to

⁴⁹⁴ There are currently 188 States that are parties to the Chicago Convention. See *Status of Chicago Convention*, *supra* note 67.

⁴⁹⁵ See Montreal Convention, *supra* note 15.

make use of this freedom now, in the long term, all states should benefit from setting a low limit on vertical sovereignty.

Space tourism and other vehicles capable of operating in the near space area are nearing commercial feasibility. Intercontinental hypersonic vehicles are being planned. A low limit on state sovereignty would allow these vehicles to operate freely without being obstructed by a political veto from the underlying state. Overflight rights would not be required which would save all the time and effort required to negotiate the web of air transit agreements now required to operate an international airline.

More and more states are developing their own domestic space launch capability. Few of these new space powers will be able to freely access space, or utilize the most efficient launch azimuths, if neighboring states can claim sovereignty up to even 62 miles (100 kilometers). They will have even more difficulty returning objects to Earth if the boundary is set at that altitude. Even the United States and Russia are facing limitations on their ability to freely access space. Setting a low vertical limit on state sovereignty will ensure all states have equal access to space.

States should not be able to object to neighboring state's vehicles merely because of the vehicle's location. However, to ensure safety along with free access, uniform rules for operation of these vehicles are required. States should work together to develop international standards for operation of these vehicles so that they are designed and operated safely. There may not be much activity in the near space area now, but there will be in the future. It is time to start working for the day when vehicles are routinely operating in this area. There is time now to thoroughly consider and implement appropriate rules. This is not something that will go away if ignored. The first step is defining the vertical limit of state sovereignty. Settling this will force states to get past their security concerns and focus on safety.

I recommend that ICAO be given authority to create Standards and Recommended Practices for vehicles operating in the near space area. ICAO has much experience drafting similar rules for operation of aircraft; rules for vehicles operating at higher altitudes should be similar. Using ICAO will speed up the process by avoiding the creation and staffing of a new international treaty organization. It will also save money because it should cost less to increase the staff of ICAO instead of creating a new organization from scratch.

Defining the boundary between a state's sovereign territory and free "outer space" will also add clarity to all of the treaties that are currently written in a functional manner without defining where "space" begins. Finally, defining the vertical extent of a state should preclude future conflict among states that would arise if, or when, states begin making territorial claims up to different altitudes.



Comments

